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Miranda Perry Fleischer† & Daniel Hemel††
The notion of a universal basic income (UBI) has captivated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent months. Pilot studies of a
UBI are underway or in the works on three continents. And prominent voices from
across the ideological spectrum have expressed support for a UBI or one of its variants, including libertarian Charles Murray, Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes, labor leader Andy Stern, and—most recently—former President Barack Obama.
Although even the most optimistic advocates for a UBI will acknowledge that nationwide implementation lies years away, the design of a basic income will require
sustained scholarly attention. This Article seeks to advance the conversation among
academics and policymakers about UBI implementation.
Our prior work has focused on the philosophical foundations of a basic income;
here, we build up from those foundations to identify the practical building blocks of
a large-scale cash transfer program. After canvassing the considerations relevant to
the design of a UBI, we arrive at a set of specific recommendations for policymakers.
We propose a UBI of $6,000 per person per year, paid to all citizens and lawful permanent residents via direct deposit in biweekly installments. We argue—contrary to
other UBI proponents—that children and seniors should be included, that marriage
penalties and cost-of-living adjustments should be rejected, that recipients should
have a limited ability to use future payments as collateral for short- and mediumterm loans, and that the Social Security Administration should carry out the program. We also explain how a UBI could be financed through the consolidation of
existing cash and near-cash transfer programs as well as the imposition of a relatively modest surtax on all earners.
Importantly, the building blocks of a UBI do not necessarily determine its outward face. By this, we mean that economically identical programs can be described
in very different ways—for example, as a UBI with no phaseout, a UBI that phases
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out with income, and a “negative income tax”—without altering any of the essential
features. To be sure, packaging matters to the public perception of a UBI, and we
consider reasons why some characterizations of the program may prove more popular than others. Our Article seeks to sort the building blocks of a UBI out from the
cosmetic components, thereby clarifying which elements of a UBI shape implementation and which ones affect only the outward appearance.
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INTRODUCTION
The notion of a universal basic income, or UBI, has captivated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent years. Across the globe, countries ranging from
Brazil to Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Kenya, Uganda, and
Canada are conducting or have recently concluded pilot studies of
a UBI.1 Here in the United States, the city of Stockton, California,
has partnered with a nonprofit organization to give checks of $500
a month—no strings attached—to several dozen families; 2 a
mayoral task force in Chicago has recommended a similar pilot
program that would pay one thousand people $1,000 a month;3
and the Hawaii legislature has launched a working group to evaluate a UBI in the Aloha State.4 A tech-funded nonprofit has hatched
a plan to give $1,000 a month to one thousand families in two asyet-unannounced states,5 with the stated goal of taking a “first
step toward defining a new social contract for the 21st century.”6
And prominent voices from across the ideological spectrum have
taken up the UBI idea as well: libertarian Charles Murray, 7
Facebook cofounder and Obama campaign strategist Chris Hughes,8
1
See Karla Lant, Universal Basic Income Pilot Programs (Futurism), online at
https://futurism.com/images/universal-basic-income-ubi-pilot-programs-around-theworld (visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable). See also Leonid Bershidsky, In
Finland, Money Can Buy You Happiness (Bloomberg, Feb 9, 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/QUW2-8AZ5 (noting the completion of Finland’s UBI pilot); Gretchen
Frazee, Ontario Is Canceling Its Basic Income Experiment (PBS NewsHour, Aug 6, 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/SS3K-7ZL2 (noting the premature end of Ontario’s UBI pilot
after a conservative political party took over the province’s government).
2
See Sam Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Residents, No Strings Attached (Marketplace, Feb 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/
3BTN-TNNL.
3
See Fran Spielman, Plan to Pay 1,000 Residents $1,000 a Month—No Strings Attached—Pitched by Panel (Chicago Sun-Times, Feb 7, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/
U43F-UF7B.
4
See Hawaii House Concurrent Resolution No 89-17, Hawaii House of Representatives, 29th Legis (May 5, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/K4PT-FK8W.
5
In addition to the one thousand families receiving $1,000 a month, a control group
of two thousand families will receive $50 a month. See Basic Income Project Proposal:
Overview for Comments and Feedback *13–14 (Y Combinator Research, Sept 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/XT9Z-56H9; Nitashka Tiku, Y Combinator Learns Basic Income
Is Not So Basic After All (Wired, Aug 27, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9N4S-B4RX.
6
The First Study of Basic Income in the United States (Y Combinator Research,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/75YB-EB8J.
7
See Charles Murray, In Our Hands: A Plan to Replace the Welfare State 6–10 (AEI
rev ed 2016).
8
See Chris Hughes, Fair Shot: Rethinking Inequality and How We Earn 91–95
(St. Martin’s 2018).
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and former labor leader Andy Stern9 all have offered proposals for
nationwide programs that resemble a UBI. 10 Former President
Obama floated the idea of a universal income in a July 2018 speech
in South Africa;11 Hillary Clinton now says she seriously considered adding a basic income plank to her 2016 presidential campaign platform;12 and entrepreneur Andrew Yang—who made a
UBI the primary plank of his bid for the 2020 Democratic presidential nod—attracted more support in fundraising and polls
than many well-established politicians, including several sitting
senators.13
All the while, the mechanics of how a nationwide UBI would
work have drawn relatively little attention. Most experiments, for
example, are designed to test the effects of unrestricted cash
transfers on health, educational attainment, workforce participation, and subjective measures of well-being among a small population—not to gauge whether such programs are scalable to a
country of 330 million. Those who have offered concrete nationwide UBI proposals have skipped over details that could determine the success or failure of a UBI—such as precisely how it
would phase out, whether benefits would be assignable, and
which agency would administer what would likely be the largest
program of periodic cash transfers in human history. Some
9
See Andy Stern with Lee Kravitz, Raising the Floor: How a Universal Basic Income
Can Renew Our Economy and Rebuild the American Dream 201–02 (Public Affairs 2016).
10 In addition to those of Hughes, Murray, and Stern, a number of other UBI books
have garnered significant publicity. See generally, for example, Annie Lowrey, Give People
Money: How a Universal Basic Income Would End Poverty, Revolutionize Work, and Remake the World (Crown 2018); Rutger Bregman, Utopia for Realists: How We Can Build
the Ideal World (Little, Brown 2017) (Elizabeth Manton, trans); Philippe Van Parijs and
Yannick Vanderborght, Basic Income: A Radical Proposal for a Free Society and a Sane
Economy (Harvard 2017).
11 See Obama’s Full Speech About the ‘Politics of Fear and Resentment’ (CNN, July
17, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/C7TJ-4Z58 (“[W]e’re going to have to consider new
ways of thinking about these problems, like a universal income. . . . [W]e’re going to have
to worry about economics if we want to get democracy back on track.”).
12 See Hillary Rodham Clinton, What Happened 238–39 (Simon & Schuster 2017).
See also Dylan Matthews, Hillary Clinton Almost Ran for President on a Universal Basic
Income (Vox, Sept 12, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/KUX3-KTM5.
13 See Joe Garofoli, Andrew Yang Doing Better Than Many Veteran Politicians in
First White House Run (SF Chron, July 17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/
D9RP-DVJB. Yang withdrew from the race in February 2020 after qualifying for all of the
2019 Democratic debates but failing to win delegates in the Iowa caucuses or New
Hampshire primary. See Matt Stevens, Andrew Yang Drops Out: ‘It Is Clear Tonight from
the Numbers That We Are Not Going to Win’ (NY Times, Feb 11, 2020), archived at
https://perma.cc/W5MP-DLQV.
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insights can be gleaned from academic studies in the late 1960s
and early 1970s regarding the design of a “negative income tax,”14
but technological transformations and several decades’ worth of
social science research render much of that work in need of updating.
To be sure, even the most optimistic advocates for a UBI will
acknowledge that nationwide implementation lies years—if not
decades—ahead. And accordingly, one might argue that hashing
out the nitty-gritty programmatic specifications of a UBI puts the
cart before the horse. But as we seek to show below, these design
details in many cases are the horse. What might seem like technical aspects of a UBI (for example, whether it is paid weekly,
monthly, annually, or once in a lifetime; whether an individual’s
future stream of UBI payments can be posted as collateral for a
loan; and whether a spouse’s income is factored into the calculation of a phaseout) turn out to be essential elements that affect
whether a future UBI will live up to the high expectations that
supporters have set.
Moreover, while we hazard no predictions as to the imminence of a UBI, we note that if and when a UBI comes, it could
come fast. A predecessor to the UBI—the negative income tax—
went from academic idea to presidential policy priority in seven
short years in the 1960s.15 In April 1970, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly to adopt a bill providing a minimum
14 See generally, for example, Michael R. Asimow and William A. Klein, The Negative
Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 Harv J Legis 1 (1970) (discussing accounting, timing, and income-averaging issues related to designing a negative
income tax); William D. Popkin, Administration of a Negative Income Tax, 78 Yale L J 388
(1969) (analyzing administrative concerns with existing welfare programs and their implications for a negative income tax); James Tobin, Joseph A. Pechman, and Peter M.
Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 Yale L J 1 (1967) (offering specific
recommendations about various technical issues related to a negative income tax such as
defining the family unit, defining income, and crafting a payment schedule); Sheldon S.
Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U Pa L Rev 678 (1969) (criticizing Professors Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski’s proposal on administrative
grounds); Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax Statute, 78 Yale L J 269 (1968) (proposing a model negative income tax statute while addressing policy considerations and
whether complementary welfare strategies should be pursued).
15 Professor Milton Friedman coined the term “negative income tax” in Milton
Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 192 (Chicago 1962). In August 1969, President Richard Nixon delivered a televised address to the nation in which he unveiled a proposal for
a “Family Assistance Plan” that was loosely modeled on Friedman’s negative income tax
idea. On the history of the negative income tax and the Family Assistance Plan, see Daniel
P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income: The Nixon Administration and the
Family Assistance Plan 50–59, 136–46 (Random House 1973).
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income of $500 per parent and $300 per child for families in the
United States—the equivalent of more than $10,000 for a family
of four in today’s dollars.16 And while the bill ultimately failed in
the Senate, the very notion that such a scheme could command
bipartisan support in one house of Congress would have seemed
virtually unimaginable only a few years earlier. The path from
political implausibility to national policy is sometimes quite
short.
If and when such support does coalesce into law, the implementation of a UBI may prove to be the most important domestic
policy endeavor of our time. If it succeeds, it could mean the end
of extreme poverty—at least in advanced industrialized economies. Yet if it does not deliver on its promise to improve the lives
of recipients or if it causes massive departures from the workforce
that undermine economic growth, then the failure of a UBI could
cast a long shadow over cash-assistance efforts for decades to
come. In sum, the stakes involved in the implementation of a UBI
are potentially enormous, making attention to implementation
details all the more essential.
This Article seeks to advance the conversation among academics and policymakers about UBI implementation. Our prior
work has focused on the philosophical foundations of a UBI; 17
here, we build up from those foundations to identify the practical
building blocks of a large-scale cash transfer program. Specifically, we focus on six building blocks of a UBI. By “building
blocks,” we refer to core components of any UBI that will shape
policy outcomes significantly. To preview, our six 18 building
blocks are:
• Size: How much will the basic income be?

16 See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Historical Consumer
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) *4, archived at https://perma.cc/B7BW
-MR7Z (ratio of July 2019 CPI to April 1970 CPI is 256.571 / 38.5, or 6.664, times $1,600
value of proposed minimum income for a family of four is approximately $10,662).
17 See Miranda Perry Fleischer and Daniel Hemel, Atlas Nods: The Libertarian Case
for a Basic Income, 2017 Wis L Rev 1189, 1203–44.
18 One might ask: Why six? Why not, for example, split the “eligibility” block into two
(citizenship and age) so there are seven? Fair question. We have found—after workshops
and numerous drafts—that the six-block structure creates a manageable framework for
studying and discussing UBI implementation. We do not claim that there is anything magical to the number six though, and we acknowledge that a list of this sort entails an inevitable dose of arbitrariness. That said, the content of these six blocks is neither arbitrary
nor unique to a UBI; it reflects design decisions inherent to any program of redistribution.
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Eligibility: To whom will the basic income extend, and
what eligibility criteria (if any) must potential recipients
satisfy?
• Uniformity: Will payments vary based on geographic location, household size, or wealth?
• Assignability: Can individuals transfer their right to future payments (for example, as collateral for a loan)?
• Payment Mechanism: How will the actual cash transfer to
UBI recipients work? How often will payments be made?
Which agency or agencies will be tasked with implementing the program? and
• Funding Mechanism: Will a UBI be funded by the elimination of other social welfare programs (and if so, which
ones?), by additional taxes, or by a combination of both?
Our analysis draws from studies of the existing tax-andtransfer system and from ethical and political theory. In most instances, our analysis yields a set of specific recommendations for
policymakers. For example:
• Size: While no number is magic, a basic income of $500
per person per month would bring an end to extreme poverty in the United States and would be feasible given the
current size of the US economy;
• Eligibility: A comprehensive basic income should cover
citizens and lawful permanent residents of all ages;
• Uniformity: Marriage penalties, asset tests, and geographic differences in payment amounts are all best
avoided;
• Assignability: Adult UBI recipients should be able, within
limits, to use future payments as collateral for short- and
medium-term loans—either from private lenders or from
the government;
• Payment Mechanism: Payments should be made via direct deposit on a biweekly basis and delivered through the
Social Security Administration; and
• Funding Mechanism: The cost of a UBI should be offset
by, at minimum, the consolidation of some or all current
cash and near-cash transfer programs as well as a surtax
layered on top of the existing tax structure and administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Importantly, the building blocks of a UBI do not necessarily
determine its outward face. By this, we mean that economically
identical programs can be described in very different ways
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without altering any of the essential features. For example, a
basic income for all individuals funded by an additional income
tax can—without any substantive change—be recast as a “negative income tax” that only provides benefits to individuals or
households below a certain income threshold. Likewise, a
monthly or annual UBI that can be posted as collateral for a loan
also can be redescribed as a once-in-a-lifetime “stakeholder
grant”—again without much more than a cosmetic change. Of
course, packaging does matter to the public perception of a UBI,
and we consider reasons why some characterizations of the program may prove more popular than others. A key contribution of
this Article is to sort the building blocks of a UBI out from the
cosmetic components, thereby clarifying which elements of a UBI
shape implementation and which ones affect only the external
appearance.
We approach these questions from a distinct disciplinary perspective—as tax law scholars—and our own views as to how the
building blocks of a UBI ought to be assembled are colored by our
observations of the federal income tax system in operation. The
federal income tax serves as a model for a UBI in many respects
but certainly not in all. The definition—or rather, definitions19—
of income in the Internal Revenue Code provide a starting point
for any calculation of the surtaxes that would be used to finance
a UBI. Experiences with the earned income tax credit (EITC) over
the past four decades and with the child tax credit over the past
twenty years yield insights regarding the implementation of cashtransfer programs. Challenges related to bubble rates and marriage penalties—familiar from the income tax context—loom over
the design of any UBI scheme. And the IRS stands as one, but not
the only, agency that might have the capabilities and expertise to
administer a program of a UBI’s size and scope.
Our analysis also is informed by our engagement with ethical
and political theory. How the building blocks of a UBI should be
assembled will depend in large part on the philosophical foundations upon which a UBI rests. A variety of philosophical approaches—including welfarism, resource egalitarianism, and libertarianism—potentially lend support to the idea of a UBI, but
translating the abstract idea of a UBI into a concrete proposal
exposes the junctures at which these various approaches diverge.
19 See John R. Brooks, The Definitions of Income, 71 Tax L Rev 253, 253 n 2 (2018)
(noting the alternative definitions of “income” within various sections of the Internal Revenue Code).
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These differences go beyond the questions of size, eligibility, and
funding mechanisms: for example, welfarists and libertarians
may find that they arrive at very different answers to the question of whether rights to future UBI payments should be assignable. While we believe that a successful UBI movement will need
to adopt an open-tent attitude toward supporters from different
philosophical perspectives, thinking through the design details of
a UBI will shed some light on whether this intellectually divided
house can stand.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the UBI idea, distinguishes it from traditional welfare
programs, and explains the essential similarities among UBI proposals with different labels. Part II bores down into the foundations of a UBI with the aim of identifying the ethical and philosophical premises upon which a UBI rests. Part III canvasses the
considerations that inform the design of a UBI and then provides
policymakers with a set of specific recommendations influenced
by both tax policy and ethical theory. Part IV looks toward the
outward appearance of a UBI: How should the program be presented to the public? We weigh the political advantages and disadvantages of various framings (UBI vs. negative income tax;
phaseout vs. no phaseout), and we explain how the outward framing of a UBI can be separated from its inner workings. We conclude by considering the ways in which the UBI debate can inform
the design of antipoverty programs in the here and now, before
support for a UBI achieves critical mass (if it ever does). A UBI,
we argue, is not all-or-nothing, and many of the innovations discussed here can be repurposed to improve upon existing antipoverty and cash-transfer programs.
I. THE BASICS OF A UBI
A universal basic income, or UBI, refers to a program that
ensures that all members of a polity have access to at least a minimum sum of money.20 At bottom, it is a method for distributing
resources among individuals within a given society. It could—but
need not—replace existing welfare programs. It also could—but
20 A UBI would almost certainly not be paid in physical currency. Instead, debit cards,
direct deposit, or virtual currency are the most likely delivery mechanisms (although physical checks also remain a possibility). See Dom Galeon, Universal Basic Income Could Become a Reality, Thanks to This Technology (Futurism, Mar 10, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/9B6J-4P2H (discussing UBI experiments that rely on blockchain-based
payments). We discuss payment mechanisms at greater length in Part III.E.
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also need not—be cast as a response to automation-induced job
losses. What distinguishes a UBI from other transfers is that it is
unconditional and unrestricted: that is, receipt of a UBI is not
contingent upon a particular characteristic (for example, age or
disability) or a particular activity (for example, work), and benefits are not restricted to any particular use.
Unconditional and unrestricted cash-transfer programs go by
various names, such as a “basic income guarantee,” a “guaranteed
income,” a “citizens income,” a “negative income tax,” and a “social dividend.”21 Although these names may reflect different philosophies or objectives, they do not change the program’s core features or dictate distributional outcomes. Any given name or
frame, however, may affect the level of political support. For ease
of exposition, we use the term “universal basic income,” or “UBI,”
in Parts I–III and then discuss alternative framings in Part IV.
A.

UBI vs. the Welfare State

A UBI resembles existing welfare programs insofar as it entails the redistribution of resources from higher-income to lowerincome individuals and households. This is true even if a UBI is
characterized as being “universal” in the sense of being distributed to all individuals regardless of need.22 This is because virtually every UBI proposal envisions that the UBI will be funded,
implicitly or explicitly, with additional revenues from taxes that
increase with income. Higher-income individuals will pay more in
additional taxes than they receive from the UBI; lower-income individuals will pay less.23

21 See Carole Pateman and Matthew C. Murray, Introduction, in Matthew C. Murray
and Carole Pateman, eds, Basic Income Worldwide: Horizons of Reform 1, 2 (Palgrave
Macmillan 2012); Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income at 8 (cited in note 10).
22 We address whether a UBI should be limited to citizens, adults, or other non-needbased categories in Part III.B.
23 Professors Philippe Van Parijs and Yannick Vanderborght have written that, as a
definitional matter, a truly “universal” basic income must not be “subjected to an income
or means test.” Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income at 8 (cited in note 10). As we
discuss below, this is true only if it refers to the outward appearance of a UBI and not the
inner workings. Any UBI that is financed by an income tax can be redescribed as a cash
transfer subject to an income test because high-income individuals will contribute more
through income taxes than they receive in the form of a UBI. Likewise, any UBI financed
by a carbon tax can be redescribed as a cash transfer subject to a personal carbon emissions test because individuals whose carbon emissions exceed the mean will pay more
through carbon taxes than their UBI.
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But a UBI differs from existing welfare programs in several
key respects. First, a UBI is unconditional in the sense that it is
not contingent upon an individual showing of deservedness. Recipients need not work nor demonstrate that they are unable to
participate in the labor force. In this respect, a UBI contrasts with
most current programs. For example, the federal Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program requires non-elderly recipients to
demonstrate that they are blind or disabled.24 The Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) requires able-bodied
adults without dependents to work or to participate in training or
education for at least eighty hours per month in order to continue
to receive benefits.25 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) is available only to pregnant women and individuals who
care for minor children.26 A UBI, at least in its purest form, would
not be conditional upon disability, work effort, volunteering, caregiving, the presence of dependents, pregnancy, or any other individual factor. Also, a truly unconditional UBI—unlike many current programs27—would not exclude beneficiaries because of drug
use or past criminal activity.
Second, a UBI—unlike many current welfare programs—is
delivered via unrestricted cash or cash-like payments. This contrasts with programs that provide in-kind benefits (such as the
National School Lunch Program) and programs that provide
vouchers for specific goods and services (such as SNAP and Section 8 rental assistance). A UBI—again, at least in its purest
form—also does not restrict the range of goods and services that
recipients can purchase. By contrast, the TANF program generally delivers aid through debit-like “electronic benefit transfer”
cards, 28 and federal law mandates that states take steps to
24 See Social Security Administration, Understanding Supplemental Security Income
SSI Eligibility Requirements—2019 Edition, archived at https://perma.cc/77P5-K5S8.
25 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Able-Bodied
Adults Without Dependents (ABAWDs), archived at https://perma.cc/M6GN-E23N (last updated July 17, 2018) (explaining that unemployed individuals without dependents may
continue to receive SNAP benefits by complying with a state workfare program or by completing a SNAP Employment and Training Program).
26 See 42 USC § 608(a).
27 See Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients and Public Assistance (National Conference of State Legislatures, Mar 24, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/MF8Y-LDLJ (noting that, as of March 2017, fifteen states had passed legislation requiring drug screening
for public assistance applicants and twenty more states had proposed similar programs).
28 See, for example, New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance,
Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) Card, archived at https://perma.cc/T34Z-HA63. See
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prevent beneficiaries from using those cards at any liquor store,
gambling establishment, or strip club.29 Many states impose additional restrictions; Kansas, for example, prohibits the use of
electronic benefit cards for tobacco, tattoos, and body piercings,
and at sporting events, jewelry stores, nail salons, movie theaters,
and swimming pools. 30 A true UBI would contain no such restrictions on use.
A final feature of a UBI is that it comes in the form of regularly recurring periodic payments. The payment period could be
weekly, monthly, annually, or any other stretch. Most current
welfare programs have a similar periodic-payment feature, delivering benefits monthly (for example, SNAP and SSI) or annually
(for example, the EITC). A UBI differs, however, from the idea—
rooted in the writing of Thomas Paine 31 and popularized in
the legal academy by Professors Bruce Ackerman and Anne
Alstott32—of providing individuals with large lump-sum grants
upon entering adulthood. As we discuss in Part III.D, the difference between periodic payments and lump-sum grants may be
largely cosmetic if individuals can assign their future stream of
periodic payments as collateral for a lump-sum loan. Without free
assignability, however, the choice between periodic payments and
a lump-sum grant has important implications for the operation
of—and outcomes from—a comprehensive cash-transfer scheme.
In theory, a UBI can act as a substitute for the existing welfare system or as a complement to it. There is much to be said for
both approaches, and we review the main arguments in the
substitute-versus-complement debate as part of our discussion of
funding mechanisms in Part III.F. Many of the key design details
of a UBI—such as how and how frequently payments would be
made, whether future benefits would be assignable, and who
would administer it—do not depend upon the answer to the

also Restrictions on Use of Public Assistance Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) Cards (National Conference of State Legislatures, May 8, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/HZD3
-F75V (noting that as of 2015, at least thirty-seven states use EBT cards to issue TANF
benefits).
29 See 42 USC § 608(a)(12)(A)(i)–(iii). The law does not use the term “strip club” but
instead refers to “any retail establishment which provides adult-oriented entertainment
in which performers disrobe or perform in an unclothed state for entertainment.” 42 USC
§ 608(a)(12)(A)(iii).
30 See Kan Stat Ann § 39-709(b)(14).
31 See Thomas Paine, Agrarian Justice 27 (J. Adlard 2d ed 1797).
32 See Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society 3 (Yale 1999) (proposing a stake of $80,000 for each American at maturity and attributing the idea to Paine).
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substitute-versus-complement question. Others—such as size
and eligibility—almost certainly do.
B.

UBI vs. Negative Income Tax

While the differences between a UBI and the existing welfare
state are significant, the differences between a UBI and a socalled negative income tax are not. Moreover, some of the distinctions drawn between different UBI variants—for example, a UBI
with a phaseout and a UBI that never phases out—turn out to be
alternative ways of accounting for the same flow of funds.
To illustrate: Imagine a UBI of $6,000 per year ($500 per
month) that extends to all individuals regardless of income, coupled with an income tax of 20 percent on all non-UBI income.
Thus:
• A, who earns $0, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays no
income tax, for a net transfer from the government of
$6,000;
• B, who earns $30,000, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays
income tax of $6,000, for a net transfer to/from the government of zero; and
• C, who earns $60,000, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays
income tax of $12,000, for a net transfer to the government of $6,000.
Now imagine that instead of the above-described system, we
implement a UBI of $6,000 that phases out at a 20 percent rate
starting with one’s first dollar of non-UBI income, and that we
couple that with a tax of 20 percent on non-UBI income over
$30,000. Thus:
• A, who earns $0, receives a UBI of $6,000 and pays no
income tax, for a net transfer from the government of
$6,000;
• B, who earns $30,000, receives no UBI (because her UBI
has fully phased out) and pays no income tax, for a net
transfer to/from the government of zero; and
• C, who earns $60,000, receives no UBI (again, on account
of the phaseout) and pays income tax of $6,000, for a net
transfer to the government of $6,000.
The first example involved a UBI with no formal phaseout;
the second UBI phased out explicitly. But as should be evident,
the first and second arrangements are identical in economic
terms.
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Now imagine that instead of a UBI, we implement an arrangement involving a negative income tax. Specifically, the
income tax is 20 percent × (income − $30,000), with individuals
whose tax is negative (that is, whose pre-tax income is less than
$30,000) receiving a payment from the government of 20 percent
times the difference between $30,000 and their pre-tax income.
Thus:
• A, who earns $0, faces an income tax of 20 percent × ($0 − $30,000), which is to say, receives a net
transfer from the government of $6,000;
• B, who earns $30,000, owes nothing and is owed
nothing; and
• C, who earns $60,000, pays a tax of 20 percent × ($60,000 − $30,000) = $6,000.
As should be apparent, this third regime is the exact same in
economic terms—resulting in the exact same net transfers between individuals and the government—as the first and second.
That is, the same arrangement can be described as a UBI with no
phaseout, or as a UBI with a phaseout, or a negative income tax.33
The various framings may affect the political popularity of a UBI
proposal, but they do nothing to change its essential features.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A UBI
Our discussion so far has focused on the basic workings of a
UBI. In this Part, we shift from questions of mechanics to questions of morality and ethics. We present a brief survey of the normative foundations for a UBI in philosophy and political theory.
These justificatory arguments will—as we illustrate in Part III—
prove significant to the design of a basic income program.
The argument for a UBI boils down to three premises: (1) society should redistribute from the rich to the poor; (2) redistribution should come (largely or exclusively) in the form of unrestricted cash transfers; and (3) those cash transfers should be
unconditional—that is, available to all regardless of age, disability, work history, or other individual characteristics. These arguments, in turn, derive varying levels of support from at least three
main ethical theories: welfarism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism.

33 While these examples all involve a flat tax rate, the equivalence extends to tax
systems with graduated rate structures.
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We focus on these three theories because of their predominance
in debates over tax-and-transfer policy in the United States and
abroad.34 We note, though, that these three perspectives do not
exhaust the possible philosophical justifications for a UBI. One
author has offered an argument for a UBI rooted in the capabilities approach associated with Professors Martha Nussbaum and
Amartya Sen;35 others have defended a UBI on communitarian
grounds.36 Our focus on welfarism, egalitarianism, and libertarianism ought not be interpreted as an implicit judgment regarding
alternative ethical theories or on their amenability to a UBI.
Before proceeding, we note that none of the arguments for a
UBI outlined below imply any claim about automation and the
future of work. Some advocates of a UBI, including labor leader
Andy Stern,37 Tesla founder Elon Musk,38 and former presidential
candidate Andrew Yang,39 emphasize the potential role of a UBI
as a safety net in the event that automation leads to large-scale
job losses. Many UBI skeptics seize upon that argument as a
34 See, for example, Marc Fleurbaey and François Maniquet, Optimal Income Taxation Theory and Principles of Fairness, 56 J Econ Lit 1029, 1031 (2018) (considering welfarist, egalitarian, and libertarian perspectives on optimal taxation); Michael Pressman,
“The Ability to Pay” in Tax Law: Clarifying the Concept’s Egalitarian and Utilitarian Justifications and the Interactions Between the Two, 21 NYU J Legis & Pub Pol 141, 147–48
(2018) (stating that utilitarianism [welfarism] and egalitarianism “are two of the main
principles thought to underlie our determination of how to distribute the tax burden,”
while also considering libertarian perspectives); Dorothy Van Soest, Strange Bedfellows:
A Call for Reordering National Priorities from Three Social Justice Perspectives, 39 Soc
Work 710, 713–15 (1994) (considering utilitarian [welfarist], egalitarian, and libertarian
perspectives on fiscal policy).
35 See Edward R. Teather-Posadas, Universally Basic: An Ethical Case for a Universal Basic Income *12–14 (Colorado State University Department of Economics Working
Paper, Mar 26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/6KBG-G9J8.
36 See Philippe Van Parijs, Competing Justifications of Basic Income, in Philippe Van
Parijs, ed, Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform 3, 23–24
(Verso 1992). On “community” and “fraternity” as justifications for a government guarantee of material well-being, see Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and
Theories of Distributive Justice, 28 Stan L Rev 877, 894–97 (1976).
37 See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 166 (cited in note 9) (stating that
Stern’s main reason for supporting UBI is “its potential to deliver economic justice and
security at a time when globalization and technological progress make it harder for
Americans to find jobs that pay a living wage”).
38 See Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk Says Robots Will Push Us to a Universal Basic
Income—Here’s How It Would Work (CNBC, Nov 18, 2016), archived at
https://perma.cc/G5SF-BXAV (quoting Musk’s belief that the United States will “end up
with a universal basic income, or something like that, due to automation. . . . I’m not sure
what else one would do”).
39 See What Is the Freedom Dividend? (Yang2020), archived at https://perma.cc/
2AEC-NA65 (stating that Yang supports a UBI because of technological change).
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reason not to back a UBI. For example, former vice-presidential
candidate Senator Tim Kaine told a reporter in October 2017 that
“[t]he premise of UBI is that work will be destroyed so much that
you will need something like that [to replace it].” He added: “I
don’t completely accept that that’s the way things are going.”40
Professor Jason Furman, who chaired the Council of Economic
Advisers under President Obama, has attacked the premise that
automation will lead to large-scale unemployment and criticized
a UBI as “giving up on work and giving up on people.”41
As will become apparent, one can support a UBI without believing that work will wither away. For example, one need not
place faith in forecasts of widespread job losses in order to believe
that some individuals will be locked out of labor markets (for example, on account of undiagnosed disability) and that a UBI
serves as a normatively attractive means of guaranteeing a minimum level of well-being and autonomy for all members of society.
One also can oppose a UBI while crediting the most pessimistic
predictions about future job losses. An argument along these lines
might posit that targeted in-kind transfers (for example, Medicaid and food stamps for the unemployed), along with job retraining, represent more effective uses of resources than a UBI.
This is not to say that technological change is irrelevant to
the UBI debate. For example, insofar as technological change supersizes the rewards for certain skills and reduces the demand for
manual labor, it may contribute to widening inequality and
thereby strengthen the case for redistribution.42 But even if the
case for redistribution is undisputed, the case for a UBI still depends upon claims about the scope of redistribution (universal rather than conditional) and the form of redistribution (unrestricted
cash transfers rather than restricted transfers or transfers in
kind). Accordingly, the coming of automation-induced

40 Haley Byrd, Democrats Tiptoe Around Universal Basic Income (Independent J
Rev, Oct 2, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/PY9H-X2RD.
41 Kathleen Pender, Why Universal Basic Income Is Gaining Support, Critics (SF
Chron, July 15, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/9WLA-7HPC.
42 As Professors Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein note, debates about a UBI’s potential work-disincentive effects potentially do depend upon predictions regarding
automation-induced unemployment. If one believes that automation will lead to widespread job losses, then the concern that a UBI may discourage entry into—or encourage
exit from—the workforce becomes less salient. See Hilary Hoynes and Jesse Rothstein,
Universal Basic Income in the United States and Advanced Countries, 11 Ann Rev Econ
929, 932–33 (2019).

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

641

unemployment is neither a necessary nor a sufficient element of
the case for a UBI. For reasons explained at greater length elsewhere, we are skeptical of automation-based arguments for a
UBI.43 For the purposes of this Article, we adopt an attitude of
agnosticism toward claims about a coming “robot apocalypse,”44
and we note instances in which automation-induced unemployment would be especially relevant to a UBI’s design.
A.

The Case for Redistribution
1. Welfarism.

One possible case for a UBI proceeds from welfarism, which
is—at least within the academic fields of economics and law—the
dominant approach to the normative analysis of taxes and transfers.45 Under welfarism, the proper role of political institutions is
to maximize some conception of “welfare,” “utility,” “well-being,”
or “happiness.”46 Arguments that redistribution increases overall
welfare generally rely on the premise that the marginal utility of
income or wealth is declining.47 According to this view, taking a
dollar from a rich person decreases her utility less than it increases the utility of the poor person who receives that dollar,
thereby increasing overall utility.48

43 See Daniel Hemel, Book Review, Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth (The
New Rambler, Sept 19, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/7TJJ-TRM6, reviewing Stern
with Kravitz, Raising the Floor (cited in note 9) and Murray, In Our Hands (cited in note 7).
44 See Lowrey, Give People Money at 7, 32 (cited in note 10).
45 On the dominance of welfarist approaches, see Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge:
Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 Minn L Rev 904, 910–11 (2011).
46 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 10 (Oxford 2d ed 2002) (“[U]tilitarianism . . . claims that the morally right act or policy
is that which produces the greatest happiness for the members of society.”); Liam Murphy
and Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 51 (Oxford 2002) (defining
the goal of utilitarianism as “maximiz[ing] the total happiness of the members of a society”); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 20 (Belknap rev ed 2003) (identifying the “main
idea” of utilitarianism as the idea that a just society achieves “the greatest net balance of
satisfaction”).
47 See, for example, Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal L Rev 1905, 1947 (1987);
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems and Priorities,
89 Ind L J 1485, 1506–07 (2014); Lawsky, 95 Minn L Rev at 915–17 (cited in note 45).
48 See David F. Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax 153 (Harvard 1986); Bankman
and Griffith, 75 Cal L Rev at 1947–48 (cited in note 47); Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden
Costs of the Progressivity Debate, 50 Vand L Rev 919, 939–42 (1997).
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This premise of diminishing marginal utility of income draws
support from intuition as well as empirical evidence. Intuitively,
it seems almost axiomatic that an extra $500 per person per
month would mean a great deal to a family in poverty but would
be unnoticeable in the life of Jeff Bezos (who as of this writing
was the world’s richest person).49 Empirically, cross-national happiness studies find that additional income leads to a larger increase in self-reported happiness among citizens of poorer nations
than among citizens of wealthier ones.50 A similar phenomenon
emerges from within-nation studies conducted in the United
States: while rich people tend to be happier than their lowerincome counterparts, the relationship between income and happiness ebbs as income rises.51 The more money one already has,
the less an additional dollar contributes to well-being.
Although welfarists tend to support redistribution,52 welfarism does not translate into total egalitarianism. If, at the
extreme, a country imposed a 100 percent tax on income above
the median, then presumably no one (or virtually no one) would
49 See Natasha Frost, Jeff Bezos Just Lost $38 Billion. He’s Still the Richest Person
in the World (Quartz, July 6, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6NH9-EUSF.
50 On the relationship between income and happiness in cross-national studies, see
Thomas D. Griffith, Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 BC L Rev 1363, 1372–74,
1378–79 (2004) (citing a study that found “[a]n extra dollar of income in a poor nation . . .
produced thirty-seven times as much utility as an extra dollar in a middle nation and
seventy times as much utility as an extra dollar in a rich nation”).
51 See id at 1379–81.
52 We should note that there is a subtle—but substantive—distinction between the
claim that “the marginal utility of income is diminishing” and “the redistribution of income
from the rich to the poor increases overall utility.” Let’s assume, at least arguendo, that
total utility is lower in Scenario 1, where A earns $90x and B earns $10x, than in Scenario 2, where A earns $80x and B earns $20x. It does not necessarily follow that if we
start from Scenario 1, impose a $10x tax on A, and transfer $10x to B, we will thereby
raise total utility. First, A’s utility if she starts with $90x and then loses $10x to a tax may
be lower than if she started with $80x in the first place. This could be a function of the
well-documented phenomenon of loss aversion, or it might result from A being particularly
averse to taxation. See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion
in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q J Econ 1039, 1040 (1991) (loss
aversion); Abigail B. Sussman and Christopher Y. Olivola, Axe the Tax: Taxes Are Disliked
More than Equivalent Costs, 48 J Marketing Rsrch S91, S91–S92 (2011) (aversion to taxation). Second, B’s utility if he starts with $10x and then receives an additional $10x transfer may be lower than if he earned $20x in the first place. This result might obtain if, as
suggested by some sociological work, earning income generates greater utility (for example, through self-esteem effects) than does receipt of an equivalent transfer. On self-esteem
and earned income, see, for example, Katherine S. Newman, No Shame in My Game: The
Working Poor in the Inner City 104 (Knopf 1999). While welfarism still probably can support income redistribution, the path from the diminishing-marginal-utility premise to the
redistribution prescription requires an additional step.
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earn above the median amount, and gross domestic product would
decline precipitously. Most welfarists would thus agree that the
welfare gains generated by redistributing from low-marginalutility to high-marginal-utility individuals (that is, from the rich
to the poor) must be balanced against the welfare losses generated by the disincentive effects of high income taxes. A rich literature on optimal taxation seeks to identify the mix of taxes and
transfers that best balances these two effects.53 We do not seek to
reproduce that literature here, except to note that the optimal tax
literature will ultimately have much to say about the size of a UBI.
2. Resource egalitarianism.
Resource egalitarianism is an increasingly prominent alternative to welfarism in tax-policy discussions.54 While welfarists
generally believe that the ex post transfer of income or wealth
from the rich to the poor enhances overall utility, resource egalitarians—in the words of Professor Alstott—“tend to emphasize ex
ante equality” in the distribution of wealth and opportunities.55
Resource egalitarians further argue that the financial circumstances of one’s birth are arbitrary and should not limit one’s ability to develop skills and talents. To that end, resource egalitarianism supports ex ante redistribution in order to level the playing
field.56
Two key aspects of resource egalitarianism are a belief in
“neutrality” and the so-called choice-chance principle.57 “Neutrality,” according to Alstott, entails the view that “society should not
endorse any particular way of life or underwrite any particular

53 See, for example, J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income
Taxation, 38 Rev Econ Stud 175, 206–07 (1971). See also Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal L
Rev at 1946–47 (cited in note 47) (discussing Professor Mirrlees’s model and its consideration by other tax scholars).
54 See, for example, Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation,
121 Harv L Rev 469, 474–75 (2007) (noting the dominance of utilitarianism in tax analysis,
advocating resource egalitarianism as an alternative, and analyzing inheritance taxes
through a resource egalitarian lens); Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Endowment, 55 Duke L J
1145, 1172 (2006) (identifying Professors Ronald Dworkin, Daniel Markovits, Liam
Murphy, and Thomas Nagel as standard-bearers of the egalitarian position); Miranda
Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 BU L Rev
601, 627 (2011) (identifying and describing “resource egalitarians” and offering a resource
egalitarian analysis of the charitable tax subsidies).
55 Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 471 (cited in note 54).
56 See id at 476–77; Fleischer, 91 BU L Rev at 627 (cited in note 54).
57 Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 477 (cited in note 54).
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tastes or vision of the good, because each person is a moral agent
whose life plan is worthy of equal respect.”58 The choice-chance
principle, according to Alstott, “holds that distributions of society’s resources among individuals ought to reflect individual
choices . . . but not ‘pure’ bad luck.”59 Because of the choice-chance
principle, resource egalitarianism is often referred to as “luck
egalitarianism.”60 As Professor Samuel Scheffler explains:
This theory has different variants, but the central idea is
common to all of these variants. The core idea is that inequalities in the advantages that people enjoy are acceptable if
they derive from the choices that people have voluntarily
made, but that inequalities deriving from unchosen features
of people’s circumstances are unjust.61
In theory, this principle could be implemented by dividing initial resources equally among individuals, so that the later distributions reflect individual choice and not the chance circumstances of birth.62 Professors Ackerman and Alstott’s stakeholder
proposal reflects this ideal by attempting to limit the role that
chance plays in the financial resources available to one upon entering adulthood.63 The choice-chance distinction also can be implemented by redistributing ex post to those in unfortunate circumstances due to luck (but not to those in unfortunate
circumstances due to choice). Perhaps A was born into a financially disadvantaged family in a poor neighborhood that lacks decent schools, and B’s business goes bankrupt due to unforeseen
political circumstances beyond his control and for which there is
no insurance market, while C grows up amidst grand wealth but
58

Id.
Id.
60 See, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 Ethics
287, 289 (1999) (coining the term and criticizing the emphasis on luck); Richard J.
Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism Interpreted and Defended, 32 Phil Topics 1, 1, 13–15 (2004)
(defending the theory); Samuel Scheffler, What Is Egalitarianism?, 31 Phil & Pub Affairs
5, 5, 31 (2003) (critiquing luck egalitarians for not rooting luck egalitarianism in a “more
general conception of equality as a moral value”).
61 Scheffler, 31 Phil & Pub Affairs at 5 (cited in note 60).
62 This assumes perfect insurance markets, which would enable individuals to insure
against future bad luck. Imagine that a series of storms causes crop failure. Whether to
insure against that possibility is a choice. If D does not insure and goes bankrupt but E
does and survives the bad season, insurance has transformed the result to one of choice
from one of weather-dependent luck. For more on the role of insurance, see Ronald
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory of Practice and Equality 76–77 (Harvard 2000).
63 Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 25–26 (cited in note 32).
59
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squanders his inheritance. The choice-chance principle suggests
that A and B—but not C—merit redistribution. Here, resource
egalitarianism and utilitarianism potentially diverge: inequalities that arise from different individual choices do not justify
transfers from the rich to the poor according to the resource egalitarian view, even if those transfers would increase overall utility.
Not surprisingly, one criticism of luck egalitarianism is that
distinguishing between choice and chance is a fraught exercise.64
If a smoker contracts lung cancer, is that a function of choice or
chance?65 What about an individual who contracts skin cancer after failing to wear long sleeves or apply sunscreen in young adulthood? Critics of luck egalitarianism argue that implementation of
the choice-chance principle ultimately requires “moralizing judgments” of individual choices and prioritizes some people’s judgments over others. The result, critics contend, is a profoundly
anti-egalitarian regime that ranks individuals as more or less deserving of state assistance based on the subjective beliefs about
deservedness held by the majority or by those in power.66
The philosopher Professor Elizabeth Anderson has argued for
a version of egalitarianism that, in her view, avoids some of the
pitfalls of the choice-chance principle. 67 She posits that the
“proper . . . aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate the impact of brute luck from human affairs” or “to ensure that everyone
gets what they morally deserve,” but instead to “end oppression”
and “to create a community in which people stand in relations of
equality to others.”68 On this view, each individual—regardless of
her choices—should have “effective access to enough resources to
avoid being oppressed by others and to function as an equal in
civil society.”69 This includes access to adequate nutrition, shelter,
clothing, medical care, and education, along with a range of other
civil, economic, and political rights.70

64

See, for example, Anderson, 109 Ethics at 310–11 (cited in note 60).
See id at 310 (discussing the smoker example).
66 Id.
67 Id at 289. The contributions of Ackerman and Alstott, Scheffler, and Anderson are
but a portion of the rich “equality of what” debate in the philosophical literature. Although
we address the aspects of that debate most crucial to UBI programs, a full exploration of
it is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more expansive treatment, see Fleischer, 91
BU L Rev at 623–35 (cited in note 54) and sources cited therein.
68 Anderson, 109 Ethics at 288–89 (cited in note 60).
69 Id at 320.
70 See id at 317–20.
65
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We will have more to say about the implications of Anderson’s
view in Parts II.B and II.C. The key point for present purposes is
that egalitarians of all stripes accept (and indeed, embrace) a program of robust redistribution from rich to poor, either ex ante or
ex post. The more difficult questions for egalitarians will be what
form such redistribution should take (cash vs. in-kind) and
whether it should be conditional upon age, work, disability, or
other individual characteristics.
3. Libertarianism.
Perhaps surprisingly, some of the most outspoken proponents
of a UBI—such as Charles Murray and Milton Friedman—have
grounded their support in libertarian theory.71 We say that this is
somewhat surprising—or rather, may seem somewhat surprising
to many readers—because libertarianism is often thought to be
particularly hostile to the first premise underlying the pro-UBI
argument: that society should redistribute resources from the
rich to the poor. 72 Elsewhere, we have argued at length 73 that
many (but not all) strands of libertarianism can accommodate a
system of progressive resource transfers and may even require
some amount of redistribution.74 We briefly recapitulate those arguments here.
By libertarianism, we refer to a set of ethical and political
theories sharing a belief that individuals have a right to be free
from coercion, that free markets with well-defined property rights
are preferable to government command-and-control arrangements, and that the results of market interactions presumptively
should remain undisturbed.75 Underlying all of these principles,

71

See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1191–92 & nn 2–7 (cited in note 17).
This misconception likely stems from Robert Nozick’s assertion that only “a minimal state . . . is justified” and that “[t]axation . . . is on a par with forced labor.” Robert
Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia ix, 169 (Basic Books 1974).
73 See generally Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev 1189 (cited in note 17).
74 To be clear, we are not arguing that all strands of libertarianism support redistribution. We emphasize that libertarianism is a spectrum of views, some of which support
redistribution and some of which do not. See id at 1204–05.
75 For overviews of libertarian thought, see Harry Brighouse, Justice 86–94 (Polity
2004); Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy at 102–65 (cited in note 46); Eric
Mack and Gerald F. Gaus, Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition, in Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, eds, Handbook of Political Theory 115,
124–29 (Sage 2004); Peter Vallentyne and Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 1, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/YA2T-86M6. See
72

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

647

according to philosopher Professor Eric Mack, is a belief in “the
separate value of each person’s life and well-being.”76 This principle potentially poses a challenge for libertarians who believe that
property holders have a right to protect their holdings by force (or
who believe that the state should provide such protection): How
can a property holder—or the state—justify the application of
force against an individual who, at no fault of his own, finds himself in such dire circumstances that he must steal or trespass to
find life-saving food or shelter? Requiring such an individual to
sacrifice his or her life to honor the property holder’s rights would
be to deny the former’s value as a separate person. Mack therefore
concludes that libertarianism mandates some system for ensuring that no member of society finds himself or herself in a position
that requires such self-sacrifice. The provision of a minimal income to all members of society serves that purpose.77
Mack’s argument offers one (self-described) libertarian approach to justifying redistribution, but not the only one. A second
argument, advanced by philosopher Professor Matt Zwolinski and
further developed by the two of us,78 takes as its starting point the
“Lockean proviso” at the heart of much of libertarian thought. The
Lockean proviso states that individuals can justly acquire property rights by mixing their labor with unowned natural resources
so long as “enough, and as good” is left for others.79 The problem
for libertarians in a world of scarce natural resources is that private appropriation might not satisfy this condition. When, for example, X claims desirable beachfront property for herself, Y loses
access to that same land, and while Y and Z might snap up the
adjoining lots, that still leaves A, B, and C out of luck.
How, then, can libertarians who accept the Lockean proviso
as an ethical constraint ever justify the appropriation of natural
resources? One response is to say that a rising tide lifts all boats—
for example, A, B, and C may be rendered better off by X, Y, and
Z’s appropriation of beachfront property because X, Y, and Z will

also generally John Tomasi and Matt Zwolinski, A Brief History of Libertarianism (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
76 Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 Soc Phil & Pol 109,
119 (2006).
77 See id at 140.
78 See Matt Zwolinski, Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The Libertarian Case for a Basic Income for All, 19 Indep Rev 515, 523 (2015); Fleischer and Hemel,
2017 Wis L Rev at 1211–17 (cited in note 17).
79 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 21 (Hackett 1980) (C.B. Macpherson,
ed) (originally published 1689).
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build hotels and resorts that then provide A, B, and C with additional opportunities for employment and leisure. But if A can’t
find work and can’t afford a room or a meal or a spa treatment at
any of the new beachfront properties, then A would seem to have
a strong argument that “enough and as good” have not been left
for him.
And here is the role for redistribution. By imposing some
(perhaps small) tax on X, Y, and Z while redistributing the revenues to A, B, and C, we can potentially ensure that A, B, and C
are compensated for their loss of access to the ocean. Whether
that tax ought to fall on property, income, or some other base—
and how much the tax and the corresponding transfer should be—
are questions that lie beyond the scope of this brief discussion.
And, of course, embedded within this entire argument are a number of contestable empirical premises (for example, that A, B, and
C really are better off with the transfer than with unimpeded access to the beach). The point here is simply to illustrate that in a
world of scarce resources, some redistribution may be required to
satisfy the Lockean proviso, after which X, Y, and Z can (according to the libertarian view) justly dispose of their property as they
wish.
A number of other arguments for redistribution emerge from
the branch of libertarianism known as classical liberalism. One
such argument, fleshed out by Professors Gerald Gaus and Loren
Lomasky, is based on consent: In a just society that treats all individuals as free and equal, any coercion (such as in the form of a
state) must be justified.80 A just state is therefore one that each
member concludes is better than none. Gaus thus argues that “[i]f
the system of property rights is to be publicly justified, it must be
the case that everyone has reason to accept it and no one has reason to reject it.”81 He concludes: “Since some people inevitably are
left out of the general abundance of modern economies, it seems
that the [Lockean] Proviso would require that they be provided
with sufficient property so that they too are, manifestly, not disadvantaged by a system of private property rights.”82

80

See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1228–31 (cited in note 17).
Gerald F. Gaus, Social Philosophy 170 (M.E. Sharpe 1999).
82 Id. Lomasky, who conceptualizes individuals as simultaneously project pursuers
and social creatures, offers a similar argument. He argues that individuals who lack basic
necessities therefore lack the prerequisites for project pursuit and have no “rational stake
in the moral community established by [a] system of [private property] rights.” Loren E.
81
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A second argument arises from classical liberalism’s
acceptance of a role for the state as a producer of public goods.83
Redistribution is plausibly a public good for at least two reasons.
One is that redistribution may reduce crime and thus serve a similar function to state-provided police services.84 Another is that
poverty—in the words of economist Mark Pauly—“offends the esthetic and moral sensibilities” of individuals who encounter it,85
and thus redistribution to alleviate poverty might be justified on
the same basis that classical liberals justify expenditures on
street cleaning and public parks.
As discussed below, these various rationales for redistribution will have divergent implications as to the amount of redistribution that might be required or desired. We defer discussion of
that issue to Part III.A. Before that, we turn toward the second
premise underlying the case for a UBI: that redistribution ought
to take the form of unrestricted cash transfers.
B.

The Case for Cash Transfers

Assuming that redistribution to the poor is justified, why
should that redistribution occur through unrestricted cash transfers? Why not instead transfer benefits in kind, or through vouchers for specific goods and services? As above, we consider these
questions from welfarist, egalitarian, and libertarian perspectives, explaining how each approach might justify the cashtransfer aspect of a UBI.
1. Welfarism.
While the welfarist case for redistribution is relatively
straightforward, the welfarist claim that redistribution should
take the form of unrestricted cash transfers is more tentative. The
Lomasky, Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community 127 (Oxford 1987). Lomasky concludes that a basic safety net is justified to give them such a stake:
If a person is otherwise unable to secure that which is necessary for his ability
to live as a project pursuer, then he has a rightful claim to provision by others
who have a surplus beyond what they require to live as project pursuers. In that
strictly limited but crucial respect, basic rights extend beyond liberty rights to
welfare rights.
Id at 126. For a critique of this argument, see generally Tibor R. Machan, Against
Lomaskyan Welfare Rights, 14 Reason Papers 70 (1989).
83 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1224–28 (cited in note 17).
84 See Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J Pub Econ
35, 37–38 (1973).
85 Id at 37.
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challenge for welfarist proponents of a UBI is to prove that unrestricted cash transfers increase utility by more than a welldesigned and equally expensive program of redistribution inkind. Intuition and empirical evidence can bring us some of the
way toward validating this proposition, but not all of the way.
Start with the intuition. Most of us would prefer to receive
one dollar in cash rather than either one dollar’s worth of goods
in kind or a one-dollar voucher to purchase particular goods and
services. Imagine that you have the choice between a dollar in
cash, a one-dollar candy bar, and a one-dollar voucher allowing
you to purchase certain kinds of food in a grocery store (for example, fruits and vegetables but not soda). With a dollar in cash, you
can choose whichever of the candy bar, fruits and vegetables, and
soda that you desire the most. Just as importantly, you can also
walk across the street and spend the dollar at a record store if you
prefer.86 For this reason, most of us prefer to receive our salaries
in monetary form rather than as bundles of goods and services
selected by our employers (except perhaps when tax incentives
encourage us to choose the bundle of goods and services over the
cash).87
Indeed, imagining a world in which individuals are paid in
fruit-and-vegetable vouchers rather than cash serves to illustrate
the inefficiency of restricted transfers. The individual who prefers
soda over fruits and vegetables might use her vouchers to buy bananas, sell her bananas on the secondary market for cash, and
spend that cash on soda. While ultimately the individual can buy
the soda she desires, this series of exchanges generates unnecessary transaction costs that deplete the value of the transfer. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some SNAP recipients already engage in these sorts of transactions to translate their benefits into
cash that they then use to purchase goods and services that SNAP
86 Assuming record stores still exist. See Number of Independent Record and CD
Stores in the United States from 2003 to 2013 (Statista, Apr 8, 2016), online at
https://www.statista.com/statistics/192691/independent-cd-and-record-stores-in-the-us/
(visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (noting that the number of independent
record and CD stores in the United States declined by more than 50 percent from 2003
to 2013).
87 Many in-kind fringe benefits are not taxed. Thus, for example, an employee facing
a 35 percent tax rate might prefer $100 of untaxed employer-provided meals over $100 in
wages because the wages will be reduced to $65 after taxes. The employee would likely be
willing to forgo $100 of food in exchange for $100 of cash (which she could, if she wanted
to, use to buy $100 of food), but she may prefer $100 of employer-provided meals over $65
of cash.
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does not cover.88 From a welfarist perspective, these transaction
costs are pure waste that society should strive to avoid.
Yet intuition and anecdote get the welfarist only so far. The
welfarist presumably cares not only about short-run utility but
about long-run utility: Perhaps today we would prefer the dollar
in cash so that we can buy a soda, but years from now we might
for health reasons prefer that our choice had been restricted to
fruits and vegetables. And while some recipients of restricted or
in-kind transfers might engage in secondary market transactions
to convert their benefits into cash, others will stick with what
they are given. Moreover, the welfarist cares not only about the
welfare of the redistribution recipient but also the welfare of others. For example, the recipient might choose to spend a dollar on
soda, but the welfarist cares as well about the negative externalities from the obesity epidemic. Externality concerns apply with
even greater force when the transfer goes to an adult who cares
for children.89
At this point, the welfarist argument turns from intuition to
empirical evidence. And existing evidence from cash-transfer programs suggests that such transfers increase measurable outcomes associated with welfare in the long term. Studies in domestic contexts suggest that cash transfers are associated with
improvements in infant health, increased test scores, additional
years of schooling, and a lower rate of arrests among young
adults.90 More evidence is available from studies in the developing

88 See, for example, Kevin D. Williamson, The White Ghetto (National Review, Dec
16, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/S5P3-EEAH (describing trading soda purchased
with SNAP benefits for cash and other items).
89 We believe, however, that the common concern that parents who are negligent
(perhaps due to drug addiction or mental illness, for example) will waste their children’s
UBI by spending it on themselves instead of their children is overblown. First, empirical
studies of cash-transfer programs consistently find that these transfers do not result in
more spending on alcohol and other drugs (and may indeed have the opposite effect). See
David K. Evans and Anna Popova, Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods, 65 Econ Dev &
Cultural Change 189, 204–07 (2017). Second, current aid programs often exclude parents
suffering from addiction and mental illness because of employment requirements, complicated application procedures, drug tests, and bans on participation by drug felons. For the
children of these parents, “something” from a UBI will be better than the “nothing” they
may get under the current system. Third, a UBI would not replace the existing legal system that addresses abuse and neglect (even if imperfectly). See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017
Wis L Rev at 1247–48 (cited in note 17).
90 See Hilary Hoynes, Doug Miller, and David Simon, Income, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, and Infant Health, 7 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 172, 195–96 (2015) (finding that the
EITC increases mean birth weight and reduces the incidence of low birth weight); Gordon
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world, which show that cash transfers lead to reductions in child
hunger and increased consumption of vitamin- and protein-rich
foods such as fruits, vegetables, and meat.91 Importantly, these
studies also suggest that recipients do not increase spending on
goods associated with lower welfare, such as alcohol, cigarettes,
or gambling.92 Instead, beneficiaries in the developing world generally either make capital investments (such as acquiring livestock or replacing a thatched roof with an iron roof) or increase
spending on education, food, and medical care.93
These studies strongly suggest that unrestricted cash transfers can be welfare enhancing. They do not, however, establish
that such transfers enhance welfare more than equally expensive
programs of restricted transfers enhance welfare. Frustratingly,
most UBI pilot experiments also do not include a separate treatment group receiving in-kind or restricted transfers. 94 For this
reason, the welfarist case for unrestricted cash transfers remains
uncertain. These studies and experiments should help assuage
skeptics who wonder whether recipients will waste cash transfers
on frivolous expenditures, but they do not establish the superiority of cash transfers over other forms of redistribution.
2. Resource egalitarianism.
For resource egalitarians such as Alstott, the argument that
redistribution should take the form of unrestricted cash transfers
is much more straightforward. The neutrality principle suggests
that society should not compel individuals to purchase particular
B. Dahl and Lance Lochner, The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: Evidence
from the Earned Income Tax Credit: Reply, 107 Am Econ Rev 629, 630 (2017) (looking at
EITC recipients and finding that increased incomes lead to statistically significant increases in reading and math test scores); Randall K.Q. Akee, et al, Parents’ Incomes and
Children’s Outcomes: A Quasi-Experiment Using Transfer Payments from Casino Profits,
2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ 86, 101–08 (2010) (finding that teens raised in households that
received UBI-like cash transfers of approximately $4,000 per year were 22 percent less
likely to have been arrested at ages sixteen to seventeen than teens in a comparison group
whose families did not receive transfers).
91 See, for example, Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, Policy Brief: Impacts of
Unconditional Cash Transfers *17–18 (Oct 24, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/RT8X
-2WSQ. See also Esther Schuering, Social Cash Transfers in Zambia: A Work in Progress,
in Degol Hailu and Fábio Veras Soares, eds, Cash Transfers: Lessons from Africa and
Latin America, 15 Poverty in Focus 20, 20 (2008).
92 See Evans and Popova, 65 Econ Dev & Cultural Change at 190 (cited in note 89).
93 See, for example, Haushofer and Shapiro, Policy Brief at 16–17 (cited in note 91);
Schuering, 15 Poverty in Focus at 20 (cited in note 91).
94 See, for example, Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some
Residents (cited in note 2); Basic Income Project Proposal at *3 (cited in note 5).

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

653

baskets of goods or services; if individuals choose to spend their
basic income at, say, liquor stores, gambling establishments, or
strip clubs, then who are we to say that their version of the good
life is wrong? And since individuals who enjoy the benefit of inherited wealth already have the opportunity to choose their own
consumption basket, equality-of-opportunity principles suggest
that others ought to have the same option. Otherwise, some individuals enjoy greater consumption choices than others solely due
to the luck of being born into wealthier families. To be sure, resource egalitarians might be concerned about negative externalities arising from consumption decisions, but those negative externalities can be addressed through regulations or regulatory taxes
that affect all individuals alike—heirs and heiresses as well as
redistribution recipients.
The case for cash rather than in-kind transfers is not uniformly accepted by self-described egalitarians, however. Consider
Anderson’s critique:
The preference for income rather than in-kind transfers . . .
gives no special priority to freedom from disease over the
freedom to idle: freedom is freedom. As an account of what
we owe to one another, that seems misguided. . . . We owe
each other the rights, institutions, social norms, public goods,
and private resources that people need to avoid oppression
(social exclusion, violence, exploitation, and so forth) and to
exercise the capabilities necessary for functioning as equal
citizens in a democratic state. From a social point of view,
then, we should grant higher priority to securing certain
goods, such as education, over others, such as surfing opportunities, even if some individuals prefer surfing to schooling.95
The schooling-versus-surfing distinction is, to our ears, a rhetorically powerful one: surely education is more essential for functioning as an equal citizen than wave riding is. Yet egalitarian
proponents of cash transfers can make two compelling counterarguments to Anderson’s critique. First, many of the decisions involved in crafting an in-kind transfer scheme entail much more
contestable value judgments than the prioritization of schooling
over surfing. For example, should subsidies be available for tuition at an unaccredited vocational training school? If we rule out
surfing, what about gym membership? If we allow a specific
95 Elizabeth Anderson, A Basic Income for All: Optional Freedoms (Boston Rev, Oct
1, 2000), archived at https://perma.cc/2YZJ-KX4X (citation omitted).
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amount as a housing allowance, then what about an adult who
would prefer to crash on a friend’s couch for a couple of months
while saving up so she can start a small business or afford college?
More generally, many of the personal financial decisions that lowincome individuals must make do not have obvious right or wrong
answers. The government might say, for example, that tuition
subsidies should be available only for attendance at an accredited
institution, that gym membership should remain an unsubsidized
recreational activity rather than a subsidized component of personal health, and that individuals should not skimp on decent
housing in order to save up for other purposes. It is not so clear,
though, that these judgments are any “better” (in the sense of facilitating one’s functioning as an equal citizen) than the decisions
that individuals would make if left to their own devices.
A second resource-egalitarian response to the Anderson critique of cash transfers is that empowering individuals to make
their own personal financial decisions is itself part of what it
means to respect them as equal citizens. Let’s say that the individual who chooses to attend the unaccredited beauty school
would have been better off financially if he had spent the money
on community college courses; even so, giving the individual the
ability to make the decision between beauty school and community college allows him to more meaningfully determine his own
destiny. Equal citizenship, on this view, entails not only the opportunity to participate in collective governance but also the opportunity to engage in self-governance. Cash transfers facilitate
self-governance to an extent that restricted or in-kind transfers
cannot.
3. Libertarianism.
The case for cash rather than restricted or in-kind transfers
is most straightforward for libertarians. First, libertarians who
are skeptical of state capacity will, we think, be especially doubtful that the government can “choose better” than individuals can.
Second, and similarly to resource egalitarians, we expect that libertarians will prefer cash-transfer programs that show respect for
individual autonomy over in-kind or restricted transfer schemes
that seek to dictate an individual’s consumption basket.96 They
will react negatively to the paternalism inherent in in-kind

96

See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 17).
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transfer programs that dictate how much individuals can allocate
to nutrition versus shelter versus other priorities.
This is not to say that the libertarian case for cash rather
than in-kind transfers is open and shut. One counterargument—
and a counterargument that may appeal to some libertarians—is
that in-kind benefits serve as a screening mechanism that distinguishes the truly needy from others. For example, if offered a UBI
of $500 per month, individuals of all ability levels might gladly
accept. If offered soup kitchen meals and a bed in a homeless shelter that cost $500 per month to provide, an able-bodied adult who
is fully capable of finding a job might decline. The lower quality
of goods and services provided in kind—combined with the stigma
associated with acceptance of such benefits—may reduce take-up
among those not in dire straits and, as a result, reduce the cost of
the transfer program or leave more resources available for the
very neediest.97
We address this screening argument at greater length elsewhere. 98 Here, we briefly recapitulate two potential rebuttals.
First, the claim that in-kind benefits screen out “non-needy” individuals is highly uncertain. Insofar as the provision of aid in kind
rather than in cash makes some individuals more likely to take
up benefits than others, there is no guarantee that those who are
screened out are the ones we might want to screen out. Soup
kitchen meals might screen out the gourmands who have no particular need for state aid, or they might screen out the individuals
whose caregiving obligations make them unable to take their
meals at a particular time and location. Homeless shelter beds
might screen out the surfers whose low incomes are a function of
a strong preference for leisure, or they might screen out the assault victims who assign particular value to privacy as a result of
past trauma.99 Second, even for libertarians, minimizing the cost
of transfer programs is not the only goal. Whatever screening
97 See Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, Public Provision of Private Goods and the
Redistribution of Income, 81 Am Econ Rev 979, 983–84 (1991) (discussing the quality argument without addressing effects from stigma); Hoynes and Rothstein, 11 Ann Rev Econ
at 948–49 (cited in note 42) (finding that stigma associated with eligibility-restricted programs “reduces program take-up and the potential reach and benefits of the programs”
but “may also help target the programs, maximizing impact by reaching those who stand
to benefit the most”).
98 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1236–37 (cited in note 17).
99 For a summary of studies suggesting that in-kind benefit programs may screen
out needier individuals and families in many circumstances, see Janet Currie, The TakeUp of Social Benefits, in Alan J. Auerbach, David Card, and John M. Quigley, eds, Public
Policy and the Income Distribution 80, 112–15 (Russell Sage 2006).
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benefits come from in-kind transfers must be weighed against the
loss of individual autonomy that comes with them. The as-yetunproven screening benefits from in-kind transfers would have to
be quite powerful to overcome the libertarian case for redistribution in cash.
C.

The Case for Unconditional Transfers

The third and final component of the case for a UBI is the
claim that redistributive cash transfers should be unconditional—not limited to individuals of a particular age (for example,
the young and the elderly), or to individuals with a demonstrable
disability, or to individuals who participate in the workforce. This
is probably the most controversial component of the case for a UBI
and the point on which welfarism and resource egalitarianism are
most equivocal in their support. (Libertarians may find the claim
less problematic.) Again, we consider each theory in turn, highlighting the ways in which lack of conditionality can be justified
and evaluating potential counterarguments.
1. Welfarism.
Conditionality generates winners and losers. The winners
are individuals who meet the conditions for aid (for example, by
participating in the workforce or demonstrating disability). The
losers are, of course, those who do not. The game is arguably zerosum insofar as there is a fixed pie of resources available for redistribution: more recipients means less for each one. For welfarists,
the trade-off between the scope of benefits (that is, reaching more
people by removing conditions) and the size of benefits (that is,
increasing the transfer per beneficiary) is one of the greatest challenges in the design of a cash-transfer regime.
Conditionality would be more attractive if we knew who was
capable of work and who was faultlessly in need. What we do
know, by contrast, is that understandings of disability and deservedness are ever evolving. Before the 1960s, for example, few
in the United States understood alcoholism to be a disease.100 By
the 1990s, alcoholism and drug abuse were considered to be disabilities that potentially qualified an individual for benefits under
the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
100 See Anjali Talcherkar, Timeline: History of Addiction Treatment (Recovery.org,
Dec 7, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/XH8Q-Y88Y.
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Security Income (SSI) programs—though Congress reversed
course in 1996 and barred the Social Security Administration
(SSA) from considering alcoholism and drug addiction as factors
qualifying individuals for benefits.101 Prior to the 1980s, individuals suffering from mental illnesses such as major depressive disorder struggled to qualify for DI and SSI benefits;102 today, more
than a third of DI beneficiaries and more than six in ten nonelderly SSI beneficiaries fall into the “mental disorders” diagnostic
category.103 Individuals unable to work on account of substance
abuse disorders or depression might have been branded as “at
fault” for their circumstances in an earlier era. Awareness of our
own epistemic limitations should make us think twice before setting conditions that exclude individuals from aid today; it may be
our own lack of knowledge—or lack of sympathy—that causes us
to conclude that they are to blame for their circumstances.
Aside from the problem of defining disability in the abstract,
any conditional cash-transfer program that denies benefits to
able-bodied nonworkers encounters the additional challenge of
applying the definition of disability in individual cases. Internal
and external audits of SSA disability determinations find high error rates, with studies suggesting that anywhere from 20 percent
to 60 percent of disability benefit rejections are “false negatives.”104 Whatever the precise figure, welfarists must weigh the
inevitability of error in a conditional transfer program against the
putative upside of limiting aid to those who are “truly” in need.
The same welfarist logic that justifies redistribution in the
first place would suggest that these error costs are asymmetric:
providing nothing to disabled individuals who are erroneously
classified as “work capable” is worse than providing somewhat

101 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-121, § 105, 110
Stat 847, 852–53. The ban remains in force to this day. See 42 USC §§ 422(e), 423(d)(2)(C).
102 See Jennifer L. Erkulwater, Disability Rights and the American Social Safety Net
102–05, 129–31 (Cornell 2006).
103 Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report on the Social Security
Disability Insurance Program, 2016 *25 tbl 6 (Oct 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/
278E-SGQ3; Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2016 *76
tbl 38 (Nov 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/Z9ZY-33ZZ; Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2017 *76 tbl 38 (Sept 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/SPN9-883L.
104 See Hugo Benitez-Silva, Moshe Buchinsky, and John Rust, How Large Are the
Classification Errors in the Social Security Disability Award Process? *5–6, 48 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 10219, Jan 2004), archived at
https://perma.cc/2ASR-XU3E (summarizing past research and reestimating false negative
rate based on new methodology).
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less to disabled individuals who are correctly classified as such.
This, again, is a function of the diminishing marginal utility of
income: the first dollar matters more than the thousandth and
the millionth. The welfarist who is worried about false negatives
in disability determinations might well conclude that ensuring a
subsistence-level income for all individuals is more important
than trying to channel somewhat more in benefits to a subset of
disabled individuals by excluding others from aid.
The trade-off between scope and size is not the only factor
that a welfarist might consider when wrestling with the conditionality question. Proponents of making cash transfers conditional upon workforce participation or a demonstration of disability also worry about the effect of a UBI on labor supply. A UBI—
so the argument goes—may lead to widespread exit from the
workforce and thus to a reduction in total resources and overall
welfare.105
There are two ways in which a UBI may affect labor supply:
an “income effect” and a “substitution effect.” The term “income
effect” refers to the effect on labor supply of making someone
richer or poorer. If an individual becomes richer and therefore can
meet more of her material needs or desires, then she may allocate
more time to leisure; conversely, if she becomes poorer, then she
may allocate more time to labor. The term “substitution effect”
refers to the effect on labor supply of changing the terms of the
labor-leisure trade-off. Labor becomes more attractive relative to
leisure when after-tax wage rates rise (and, conversely, less attractive when after-tax wage rates fall).
A UBI financed through income or consumption taxes will increase the income of individuals at the low end of the income ladder (who will receive more in benefits than they pay in additional
taxes) and will reduce the income of individuals at the high end
(who will pay more in additional taxes than they get back). We
would expect the income effect on labor supply to be negative for
low-income individuals (who now have more income) and positive
for high-income individuals (who now have less). The substitution
effect on labor supply of higher tax rates is negative across the
board.
105 For a tentative argument along these lines, see Robert A. Moffitt, The Negative
Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy, 17 J Econ Perspectives 119, 124–31
(2003) (noting that the effects of a UBI on labor supply may be different for different
groups, leaving the net effect uncertain).
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Past experiences with cash-transfer programs shed some
light on the magnitude of these effects. One well-examined program involved members of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
in western North Carolina who began to receive annual disbursements of casino profits starting in 1996. 106 The disbursements
amounted to approximately $4,000 per year for each adult tribal
member. A study comparing households with children that did
and did not receive the casino-profits payments found no economically or statistically significant effect on labor supply for mothers
or fathers.107 Another program—the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend—has used the state’s substantial oil revenues to pay approximately $2,000 per resident per year since 1982.108 A study
comparing Alaska to other states with roughly similar demographics and industry compositions again found that introduction of the dividend had no significant effect on overall employment, labor-force participation, or hours worked.109 Note, though,
that in both cases the cash-transfer program would have affected
labor supply only through the income effect—there was no substitution effect, as tax rates (and after-tax wage rates) did not
change. An inflow of casino profits or oil revenues is about as close
as one can get to money dropping like manna from the heavens.
The Eastern Cherokee and Alaska natural experiments thus suggest that the income effects on labor supply of a cash-transfer program in the range of $2,000 to $4,000 per person are small or nonexistent, though they tell us nothing about the substitution effect.
Studying the substitution effect of a UBI is somewhat more
complicated. Much is likely to depend on the rate of the tax (or
tax plus phaseout) used to fund a UBI—the higher the rate, the
larger the labor-supply effect. Much will also hinge on whether
the UBI supplements or replaces existing cash-transfer programs. Some of those programs entail very high implicit tax rates.
For example, a nonblind individual who earns more than $1,220
per month in 2019 will lose DI benefits, which can mean a loss of

106 See Akee, et al, 2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ at 91 (cited in note 90) (describing the
casino dividend program).
107 See id at 108–09 & tbl 9.
108 See Damon Jones and Ioana Marinescu, The Labor Market Impacts of Universal
and Permanent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund *2 (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 24312, Feb 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/CYK4-7MSY.
109 See id at *30 tbl 2.
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up to $771 per month for a single individual.110 The marginal tax
rate on the 1,221st dollar is thus as high as 77,100 percent. Replacing DI with a UBI and a less cliff-like marginal tax rate schedule may increase labor supply among former DI beneficiaries.
Finally, it is not obvious whether the labor-supply effects of a
UBI—even if negative—should be considered a bug of a basic income or a feature. The aim of a “sufficient social income,” wrote
the late Austrian-French philosopher André Gorz, “is not to force
the recipients to accept any kind of work on any terms whatsoever, but to free them from the constraints of the labor market.”111
A UBI, Gorz emphasizes, potentially will allow individuals to opt
out of low-paying and otherwise unrewarding market labor and
instead to devote their time to their families, their communities,
or to other ennobling pursuits. While Gorz does not frame his argument in welfarist terms, the welfarist could make a similar
point: The objective of welfarism is to maximize well-being, not to
maximize output. Some amount of labor-market leakage may be
tolerable and even desirable if it allows individuals to live more
fulfilling lives.
Work requirements for able-bodied adults are not the only
sorts of conditions that might be attached to a cash-transfer program. Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs in low- and
middle-income countries often require that beneficiaries—as a
string attached to aid—ensure that children attend school, receive medical and nutrition examinations, maintain vaccinations,
or satisfy other education and health requirements. While several
of these studies have yielded encouraging results,112 relatively few
studies have compared CCTs to unconditional cash transfers.
Thus, it is difficult to know which aspect of the CCT program—
the conditionality or the cash—is driving positive outcomes. In
the few studies that compare conditional and unconditional cashtransfer arrangements, results are ambiguous. For example, one
study targeting families with adolescent girls in Malawi compared cash transfers conditional upon school attendance with
110 See Social Security Administration, SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2019, archived at https://perma.cc/8BSM-A2WW; Social Security Administration, Substantial
Gainful Activity, archived at https://perma.cc/9SK7-EEHB.
111 André Gorz, Beyond the Wage-Based Society, in Karl Widerquist, et al, eds, Basic
Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research 297, 298 (Wiley & Sons 2013).
112 For a literature review, see Mylene Lagarde, Andy Haines, and Natasha Palmer,
Conditional Cash Transfers for Improving Uptake of Health Interventions in Low- and
Middle-Income Countries: A Systematic Review, 298 JAMA 1900, 1904–08 (2007).
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unconditional cash transfers. Girls whose families received any
cash transfer (conditional or unconditional) were less likely to
drop out of school than girls whose families received no transfer,
and the effect was strongest in the conditional-cash-transfer arm
of the study, but only girls whose families received an unconditional cash transfer saw a reduction in teenage pregnancy. 113
Comparisons of conditional and unconditional cash-transfer programs in other low-income countries have arrived at similarly
mixed results.114 Not only are the lessons from low-income countries uncertain, but those lessons also are difficult to generalize
to higher-income countries such as the United States where baseline rates of school attendance are higher and teenage pregnancy
rates are lower.115
Unfortunately, ongoing and proposed UBI experiments will
do little to adjudicate the debate between unconditional and conditional cash transfers. For example, the Stockton program—
$500 a month to several dozen families with no strings attached116—will not tell us whether total welfare would be higher
if instead those several dozen families received $500 with attached strings (for example, a work requirement or a requirement
that children remain in school or receive health and nutritional
examinations). Y Combinator’s proposal similarly includes no
comparison group subject to a cash-transfer arrangement conditional upon work or other criteria.117 The “Family Rewards” experiment in New York and Memphis, billed as “the first test of a

113 See Sarah Baird, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler, Cash or Condition? Evidence
from a Cash Transfer Experiment, 126 Q J Econ 1709, 1732–36 (2011).
114 See, for example, Laura Robertson, et al, Effects of Unconditional and Conditional
Cash Transfers on Child Health and Development in Zimbabwe: A Cluster-Randomised
Trial, 381 Lancet 1283, 1290–91 (2013) (finding that conditional cash transfers had larger
average effect on school attendance but unconditional cash transfers had larger average
effect on vaccination rates).
115 As of about a decade ago, the pregnancy rate in Malawi was 154 per 1,000 females
ages fifteen to nineteen and just 57 per 1,000 females in this age range in the United
States. See Gilda Sedgh, et al, Adolescent Pregnancy, Birth, and Abortion Rates Across
Countries: Levels and Recent Trends, 56 J Adolescent Health 223, 226 tbl 1 (2015) (using
2009 data for Malawi and 2010 data for the United States). The female secondary school
enrollment rate is 98 percent for the United States and 37 percent for Malawi. See
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, School Enrollment, Secondary, Female (% Gross) (World
Bank), archived at https://perma.cc/7UY9-LGC7 (using 2016 data for the United States
and 2017 data for Malawi).
116 See Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Residents
(cited in note 2).
117 See Basic Income Project Proposal at *13–15 (cited in note 5).
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comprehensive CCT in the United States,”118 likewise included no
unconditional cash-transfer comparator. 119 Welfarists might
rightly wish for further data on the relative performance of conditional and unconditional cash-transfer programs before embracing one or the other wholeheartedly. In the meantime,
though, there is no compelling evidence that cash transfers conditional upon educational and health criteria consistently yield
larger welfare improvements than equivalent unconditional cash
transfers.120 In the absence of such evidence, the fact that conditional cash transfers entail higher administrative costs supplies
an argument—though a tentative one—for favoring unconditional programs on welfarist grounds.
2. Resource egalitarianism.
Resource egalitarianism generates a strong case for unconditional rather than conditional cash transfers, though counterarguments rooted in egalitarian principles remain. Recall that resource egalitarians generally believe that society should strive to
eliminate inequalities due to chance and then should adopt an
attitude of neutrality toward individuals’ free choices. Work requirements and other behavior-dependent conditions on the receipt of cash transfers run up against this neutrality principle. If
A and B are both initially entitled to a cash transfer so as to equalize the initial distribution of society’s resources, but then A
chooses to work while B chooses not to, why should B thereby lose
her entitlement to the transfer? According to Alstott, “voluntary
unemployment in a well-functioning market is not a matter for
concern” for resource egalitarians so long as “[e]very individual is
free to decide whether to work for the wage she commands, or to

118 Cynthia Miller, et al, Testing a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in the U.S.:
The Effects of the Family Rewards Program in New York City, 4 IZA J Labor Pol *22 (2015).
119 See id at *5–7; Cynthia Miller, et al, Effects of a Modified Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Two American Cities: Findings from Family Rewards 2.0 *6–11 (MDRC,
Sept 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/8WRV-FJYX.
120 Indeed, the Family Rewards program, which offered a range of educational,
health, and work incentives to families with children, found that CCTs raised household
income and reduced poverty but had more ambiguous effects on children’s education,
health care utilization, and parents’ work and training. See Miller, et al, Findings from
Family Rewards 2.0 at *ES-8 (cited in note 119). These findings arguably suggest that it
is the cash transfer—rather than the conditionality—that matters most.
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use her time elsewhere if the wage seems too low.”121 And if the
individual chooses to use her time elsewhere, why should society
strive to penalize her for that decision?
One possible answer comes from resource egalitarians who
believe that disabilities should be taken into account. As Anderson
writes, “disabled people typically require more resources to
achieve equivalent freedoms—to move around, to get access to information, and so forth—than those who are not disabled.” 122
Most luck egalitarians similarly account for disabilities on the
theory that such individuals require more resources in order to
have the same life choices open to them as others.123 And holding
total cost constant, a disabled individual would receive a larger
benefit under a cash-transfer regime that is conditional upon a
demonstration of disability than under an unconditional cashtransfer program. This reasoning might suggest that cash transfers should be available only to those who can demonstrate disability or who for other reasons require more resources. But as for
the latter, Anderson notes that “[p]eople who engage in unpaid
dependent care work also require more resources to achieve
equivalent freedoms.”124 Thus, even the egalitarian argument for
conditionality would not seem to justify a requirement that recipients be engaged in formal-economy labor.
There are at least two responses that a resource egalitarian
committed to unconditional cash transfers might make to those
who would account for disabilities—one a counterargument, the
other a concession. The counterargument is that denying benefits
to work-capable dependent-less adults is defensible only if society
is itself capable of identifying disability. The fact that federal law

121 Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies,
108 Yale L J 967, 1006 (1999).
122 Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95).
123 See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 115–20,
129–33 (Yale 1980) (concluding that equality requires giving relatively more resources to
disabled individuals); Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue at 77–81 (cited in note 62) (same); Eric
Rakowski, Equal Justice 120–21, 142 (Oxford 1991) (same); Richard J. Arneson, Equality
and Equal Opportunity for Welfare, 56 Phil Stud 77, 78 (1989) (describing Dworkin’s argument that disabilities should be accounted for in considering equality of resources); G.A.
Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 Ethics 906, 917–21 (1989) (describing
the egalitarian view of justice for those born with disabilities and offering a criticism of
it); Amartya Sen, Equality of What?, in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 195, 218–
19 (May 22, 1979) (arguing for equality of “basic capabilities”), archived at https://
perma.cc/WMF2-A6BA.
124 Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95).
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still requires the SSA to deny that addiction is a disability should
call into question our faith in our country’s capacity to implement
a system of accurate and compassionate disability determinations.125 This skepticism is deepened by the fact that various federal agencies and courts cannot arrive at a consensus as to which
medical professionals are qualified to diagnose disability.126 The
concession is that the case for a UBI need not imply the elimination of additional benefits for disabled individuals and/or individuals who care for dependents. As we discuss in Part III.F, the
combined cost of DI and SSI programs is sufficiently low in comparison to the total potential cost of a national UBI that maintaining or eliminating those programs will not dramatically affect
a UBI’s financial feasibility.127
3. Libertarianism.
The case for unconditional rather than conditional cash
transfers is perhaps easiest to make on libertarian grounds. First,
cash transfers show respect for individual autonomy, whereas inkind or restricted transfers that seek to dictate consumption decisions limit individuals’ ability to control important aspects of
their own lives.128 In-kind and restricted cash transfers exemplify
the sort of paternalistic government-imposed value judgments
that libertarians abhor, just as resource egalitarians generally eschew such judgments under the neutrality principle. Second,
while most libertarian arguments would in theory render transfers conditional upon a demonstration of work or inability to
work,129 the difficulties in implementing such a condition run up
against the deep-seated libertarian skepticism regarding the
state’s ability to carry out social programs. Do we want armies of
government bureaucrats deciding who is and isn’t “deserving” of
a cash payment? For some of us, this scenario is unexceptional
(and more or less describes the current DI and SSI programs). For
committed libertarians, though, this intrusiveness is anathema.
125

See 42 USC §§ 422(e), 423(d)(2)(C).
On the disagreement among the SSA, the IRS, and the courts, see Letter from Karen
L. Hawkins, Chair, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, to David Kautter, Acting
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, Comments on Information Collection Under
Revenue Procedure 99-21 *13–17 (Feb 1, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3FLP-U3JV.
127 See notes 262–264 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of the DI and SSI
programs).
128 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1234 (cited in note 17).
129 See id at 1209–10, 1239–40.
126
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Likewise, the inevitability of error in these determinations means
that a conditional safety net would not be tight enough to absolutize and legitimize property rights. In order to ensure that a
UBI is therefore serving the purpose that libertarian theories envision, it will probably have to be unconditional.130
As a general matter, we expect that libertarians will be amenable to the claim that if transfers are to occur at all, they should
be unconditional and unrestricted—and more skeptical of the
claim that any redistribution (regardless of form) is consistent
with libertarian principles. In this respect, the libertarian case
for a UBI is the opposite of the welfarist case for a UBI: whereas
welfarists are generally comfortable with the notion of redistribution but less convinced that such redistribution should come in
the form of unconditional and unrestricted transfers, libertarians
are generally more skeptical of redistribution but easily convinced that—if there is to be redistribution—it ought to be UBIlike in character.
III. BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A UBI
Having highlighted why one might pursue a UBI, we now
turn to the heart of this Article: How should policymakers design
such a program? More specifically, we identify and scrutinize the
design decisions that determine a UBI’s ultimate shape: size, eligibility, uniformity, assignability, payment mechanism, and
funding mechanism. Our approach is informed both by the philosophical literature on the foundations for a UBI and by research
in economics and law on the design of tax-and-transfer policies.
A.

Size: $500 a Month as a Starting Point

In discussions about the size of a UBI in the United States,
two focal points have emerged: $500 per month (the figure suggested by Facebook cofounder Chris Hughes131 and used in the
Stockton experiment132 ) and $1,000 per month (the figure proposed by a Chicago mayoral task force, 133 labor leader Andy
130 This argument may or may not apply to welfarism. A welfarist would compare the
welfare gains and losses from being overinclusive (that is, providing a basic income to all)
and from being underinclusive (leaving some individuals behind).
131 See Hughes, Fair Shot at 92 (cited in note 8).
132 See Harnett, A California City Is Planning on Giving Money to Some Residents
(cited in note 2).
133 See Spielman, Plan to Pay 1,000 Residents $1,000 a Month (cited in note 3).
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Stern, 134 entrepreneur and former 2020 presidential candidate
Andrew Yang, 135 and basic-income activist Scott Santens, 136
among others). 137 The $500-a-month figure happens to correspond, almost precisely, with the US Census Bureau’s threshold
for “deep poverty” for a single individual.138 The Census Bureau
estimates that more than 18 million Americans—including
nearly 6 million children—currently live in “deep poverty”;139 a
$500-a-month UBI would bring deep poverty (almost)140 to an end.
The $1,000-a-month figure corresponds almost precisely with the
Census Bureau’s overall poverty threshold for single individuals;
more than 40 million Americans—nearly an eighth of the country’s population—lives below the poverty threshold today.141
There is, to be sure, nothing magical about the deep poverty
and poverty thresholds. The poverty level is set at three times the
cost of a “minimum food diet,” updated to reflect inflation since

134

See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 201 (cited in note 9).
See Andrew Yang, The War on Normal People: The Truth About America’s Disappearing Jobs and Why Universal Basic Income Is Our Future 165–66 (Hachette 2018).
136 See Scott Santens, What If You Got $1,000 a Month, Just for Being Alive? I Decided
to Find Out (Vox, Nov 14, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/2L3G-K5D5.
137 Professors Van Parijs and Vanderborght propose a UBI set at 25 percent of a country’s per capita gross domestic product, which according to their calculations, translated
to almost $1,200 per month in the United States using 2017 data. Van Parijs and
Vanderborght, Basic Income at 11 (cited in note 10).
138 See Liana E. Fox and José Pacas, Deconstructing Poverty Rates Among the 65 and
Older Population: Why Has Poverty Increased Since 2015? *15 (US Census Bureau, Social,
Economic & Housing Statistics Division Working Paper No 2018-13, Apr 6, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6XW2-GCUC (defining “deep poverty” as below 50 percent of
the federal poverty level). See also Kayla Fontenot, Jessica Semega, and Melissa Kollar,
Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017—Current Population Reports *47 (US Census Bureau, Sept 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YJ84-AKVM (stating that the federal
poverty level for a one-person unit is $12,752 per year for individuals under age sixty-five
and $11,756 for individuals age sixty-five and over).
139 Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar, Income and Poverty in the United States at *17
(cited in note 138). Ongoing work by University of Chicago economist Bruce Meyer and
collaborators casts doubt on some of these Census Bureau poverty statistics. See generally
Bruce D. Meyer, et al, The Use and Misuse of Income Data and Extreme Poverty in the
United States (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 25907, May
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/RA2K-NT5N. Very little of our argument depends upon
the precise number of people living in Census-defined deep poverty.
140 Almost but not entirely. As we discuss in Part III.D, assignability and garnishment would mean that some individuals eligible for a UBI do not in fact receive a periodic
check.
141 See US Census Bureau, Number in Poverty and Poverty Rate: 1959 to 2016 (2017),
archived at https://perma.cc/PC4T-K259.
135
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1963,142 and the deep poverty level is simply half that. Those figures do not account for geographic differences in the cost of living
or for person-to-person differences in health-care and dependentcare expenses.143 A full-time college student with cash income of
less than $12,000 per year might live quite comfortably and yet
technically be below the poverty level. A single adult who pays
out of pocket to maintain an ailing parent at a long-term care facility may fall well above the poverty level and yet still live a
hand-to-mouth existence.
Calculations of poverty status also account for only some income sources. The definition of money income used to calculate
poverty status includes Social Security’s Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI), DI, and SSI benefits, workers’ compensation,
and unemployment compensation, but excludes noncash benefits
such as SNAP and housing subsidies as well as refundable tax
credits such as the EITC and the child tax credit.144 Replacing
noncash benefits and refundable tax credits with a cash UBI of
the same value would make it appear as though millions of
Americans had been lifted out of poverty without necessarily improving their material well-being.145 Consider a single individual
with no dependents and no cash income. The maximum Section 8
voucher for a single person in New York City as of January 2018
is $1,590, 146 and the maximum monthly SNAP allotment for a
one-person household in the lower forty-eight states for the October 2017–September 2018 year is $192. 147 Replacing Section 8

142 See US Census Bureau, Measuring America: How the U.S. Census Bureau
Measures Poverty (2017), archived at https://perma.cc/J9DA-MKTB.
143 The Census Bureau sets a slightly lower poverty threshold for individuals over age
sixty-five. This apparently stems from a belief that older individuals have lower consumption needs. For a critique of this view, see Mary Borrowman, Understanding Elderly Poverty in the U.S.: Alternative Measures of Elderly Deprivation *12 (Schwartz Center for
Economic Policy Analysis and Department of Economics, The New School for Social Research Working Paper No 2012-3, Apr 2012), archived at https://perma.cc/NL6S-EEKY.
144 See US Census Bureau, How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty (Aug 16, 2018),
archived at https://perma.cc/RB7W-GNKJ.
145 Since a UBI is a cash benefit, we assume that it would be included in the Census
Bureau’s “Census money income” definition. See US Census Bureau, Income: About (Feb
29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/JT8M-MKBB.
146 New York City Housing Authority, Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program:
Voucher Payment Standards (VPS) (Jan 1, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3V49-2CKE.
147 Memorandum from Lizbeth Silbermann, Director of Program Development Division, Food and Nutrition Service, US Department of Agriculture to All Regional Directors,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP — Fiscal Year 2018 Cost-of-Living
Adjustments *3 (July 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/F4NN-AU8X.
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and SNAP with a $500 per month UBI might make it look like
this individual is no longer in deep poverty, because his countable
income rises from $0 to $500. But if he loses Section 8 and SNAP
benefits along the way, then this person might be substantially
worse off than before.
While we therefore think it is important not to accord talismanic significance to poverty thresholds, we believe that a basic
income of $500 per person per month—approximately the threshold for deep poverty for a single individual—is a sensible starting
point for discussions of a UBI.148 We should note that since our
proposed UBI would include children, our $500-per-person-permonth suggestion would yield the same household benefit for a
single parent with one child, or for a two-parent family with two
children, as proposals by Murray, Yang, Stern, and others,149 who
would set a UBI at approximately $1,000 per person per month
but limit eligibility to adults. Our proposal, however, better protects single-parent families with children against the possibility
that a UBI would leave them worse off compared to the current
system. We discuss the inclusion of children at further length in
Part III.B.
Why $500? First, a UBI of $500 per person per month would
make a measurable difference in the lives of millions of
Americans. Indeed, studies in the United States have shown that
unconditional cash transfers of even less than that amount can
yield significant effects. A study of the Eastern Cherokee cashtransfer arrangement noted above found that an annual transfer
of $4,000 per adult ($333 per month) was associated with an extra
year of educational attainment by age twenty-one for children in
families receiving the transfer as well as a reduction in crime
rates.150 A study of the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend—again,

148 The amount should presumably adjust with changes in price levels and other economic conditions, though we set aside for present purposes the question of what index to
use. See generally Daniel Hemel, Indexing, Unchained, 83 L & Contemp Probs (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that all of the available inflation indices—including unchained and
chained versions of the Consumer Price Index—provide normatively unattractive benchmarks for year-to-year adjustments in tax-and-transfer policy parameters).
149 See Murray, In Our Hands at 7 (cited in note 7); Stern with Kravitz, Raising the
Floor at 201 (cited in note 9); Yang, The War on Normal People at 165–66 (cited in note 135).
150 See Akee, et al, 2 Am Econ J: Applied Econ at 90, 101–08 (cited in note 90).
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approximately $2,000 per year—substantially reduced the likelihood that mothers would give birth to low-birth-weight babies.151
Second, a basic income of $500 per person per month—$6,000
per year—would be financially feasible given the current size of
the US economy. In a country with approximately 314 million citizens and lawful permanent residents and a gross domestic product of approximately $20.49 trillion,152 a basic income of $500 per
person per month translates to a cost of roughly 9 percent of GDP,
or about 7 percent after the various expenditure offsets discussed
in Part III.F are taken into account.153 To put that in perspective,
US general government spending as a percentage of GDP is now
around 38 percent—or about 11 percentage points below the level
in Norway and 12 percentage points below the level in Sweden.154
We could thus afford a basic income of $500 per person per month
while keeping our government spending-to-GDP ratio below
Nordic levels. By contrast, a basic income of $1,000 per person per
month would vault us almost to the top of the government
spending-to-GDP ratio rankings, barely behind Finland (57 percent) and France (57 percent), and ahead of Denmark (55 percent).155 In the medium term, a basic income of $1,000 per person
per month would be difficult to sustain unless the United States
were willing to become one of the most heavily taxed nations, if
not the most heavily taxed nation, in the world.

151 See Wankyo Chung, Hyungserk Ha, and Beomsoo Kim, Money Transfer and Birth
Weight: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend, 54 Econ Inq 576, 581–83
(2016) (finding an 8–14 percent reduction in the incidence of low birth weight—defined as
less than or equal to 2.5 kg—infants as a result of the dividend).
152 See US Census Bureau, QuickFacts: United States, archived at https://
perma.cc/3BQX-H8ZF (approximately 327 million US residents); D’Vera Cohn, 5 Key
Facts About U.S. Lawful Immigrants (Pew Research Center, Aug 3, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/NSX8-X8NB (approximately 13 million unauthorized immigrants and
temporary lawful residents); GDP (Current US$) (World Bank), archived at
https://perma.cc/TFL3-JN2D.
153 More than 2 million Americans are incarcerated, see Wendy Sawyer and Peter
Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019 (Prison Policy Initiative, Mar 19, 2019),
archived at https://perma.cc/P3P3-XEEQ, and might (or might not) be excluded from a
UBI on that basis. Whether to extend a UBI to people in prison is a challenging normative
question that we do not tackle here. We thank André Washington for raising this point.
154 See General Government Spending: Total, % of GDP, 2015 (OECD), archived at
https://perma.cc/EV7D-T96L.
155 See id. Note that our decision to include children under age eighteen has only a
moderate impact on these magnitudes, as persons under eighteen years of age constitute
less than a quarter of the US population. See QuickFacts (cited in note 152) (22.4 percent
of population under eighteen).
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Third, setting a basic income at $500 per person per month
(or thereabouts) should allay the concerns of those who worry that
a UBI will lead to a mass exodus from the workforce. It strains
credulity to think that a substantial number of working-age
American adults will leave their jobs to live on an income roughly
equivalent to a $3-an-hour full-time wage.156 While this observation might seem to be in tension with the first, it is not. According
to a Federal Reserve survey, four in ten US adults do not have the
cash to cover a $400 emergency expense without borrowing from
friends or family or running up a credit card balance.157 For them,
$500 per month would not mean a life of leisure, but it could make
the difference between, say, repairing a broken-down car and losing a job due to lack of transportation.
But while a basic income of $500 per month should not stoke
the fears of those who think that a UBI might lead to mass indolence, it also will not live up to the hopes of those who see a UBI
as providing a safety net in an automation age.158 Average weekly
earnings for US manufacturing workers as of February 2018 were
about $900;159 a basic income of $500 per month will only slightly
soften the blow if that manufacturing worker is replaced by a robot. Again, we hazard no prediction as to whether wide-scale technologically induced unemployment is on the horizon.160 We do believe, though, that the size of a basic income is a question best
approached with a clear-eyed view of a UBI’s possibilities and its
limits.
Ultimately, the sizing of a UBI entails a number of difficult
trade-offs and value judgments. These include the trade-off between expanding unconditional cash assistance and maintaining
existing welfare state programs; the trade-off between more redistribution of wealth and greater deadweight loss from explicit
156 That is, $500 per month approximately four weeks per month and forty hours per
week equals $3.125.
157 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report on the Economic WellBeing of U.S. Households in 2017 *21 (May 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YTA8-2W6N.
158 See, for example, Scott Santens, It’s Time for Technology to Serve All Humankind
with Unconditional Basic Income (Medium, Apr 13, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/
2UFM-MASQ:

If technological unemployment is the Gordian Knot of the 21st century, UBI is the
sword that slices through it. By simply severing the connection between income
and work through the unconditional provision of an income for life that’s always
sufficient for basic needs, the fear of technological unemployment is eliminated.
159 US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation—
February 2018 *tbl B-8 (Mar 9, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8TUK-ML8W.
160 See text accompanying notes 37–44.
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or implicit income-based taxes; the trade-off between the interests of the present and those of future generations that will bear
the burden of deficit spending; and value judgments about how
much redistribution is ethically justified. We suggest $500 per
person per month as a starting point but not as an end to the discussion of amount. The size of any UBI inevitably will depend
upon both the fiscal capacity and political will of the relevant jurisdiction; as fiscal capacity and political support (hopefully)
grow, the UBI may increase in tandem. Size could be—and likely
would be—adjusted on an ongoing basis, whereas other building
blocks of a UBI may prove more difficult to refashion year to year.
Accordingly, we shift our attention to those other elements while
acknowledging that size will remain a significant decision point
and source of disagreement.
B.

Eligibility: All Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents
Should Qualify

Aside from size, a key aspect of any UBI is a specification of
eligibility criteria. Just how “universal” should a universal basic
income be? Proposals differ in their eligibility criteria in at least
four respects: (i) whether they require workforce participation of
some form; (ii) whether they apply to the elderly; (iii) whether
they apply to children; and (iv) whether they apply to noncitizens.
As explained below, we believe that (i) no work requirements
should be imposed; (ii) seniors should be eligible; (iii) children
should be eligible; and (iv) a UBI should extend to lawful permanent residents in addition to US citizens.
Start with workforce participation. President Richard
Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) would have required all
able-bodied adults to pass a “work test” in order to receive cash
aid. A woman whose youngest child was under the age of six could
have satisfied that test by caring for the child. Most other adults
would have been required—as a condition for receiving the FAP—
to register with a state employment agency and to accept training
or employment opportunities that the agency deemed suitable.161
The FAP also would have been limited to adults with children under eighteen (or under twenty-one if the child was in school);

161 See Robert J. Lampman, Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan *20 (University of
Wisconsin-Madison Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Paper No 57-69, Nov
1969), archived at https://perma.cc/7ZA6-3Z8S.
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childless adults and adults with grown children would have been
excluded entirely.162
Most other UBI proposals define eligibility to include all
working-age adults, 163 but some do not. Chris Hughes’s proposal—which he acknowledges is not a truly “universal” UBI—
tracks the FAP in significant respects: adults (of any gender)
would be eligible if they cared for a child under age six, but others
would have to work, attend school, or enroll in vocational training.164 Dylan Matthews, a writer for the online publication Vox
and a prominent voice in UBI debates, has suggested linking a
UBI to participation in national service: individuals who serve in
the military or participate in AmeriCorps- or Peace Corps–like
programs for one to two years would become eligible for a lifetime
UBI.165 An advantage of a basic income program along the lines
suggested by Hughes and Matthews is that it might tap into
widely shared views regarding deservingness: a basic income
would not simply amount to getting paid for doing nothing. The
disadvantages of work-linked transfer programs are detailed
above—including the economic distortions stemming from subsidies, the administrative costs associated with disability determinations and work verification, and the autonomy objections
rooted in resource egalitarian and libertarian thought.
Regardless of how a UBI treats working-age adults (and we
think that any program that calls itself “universal” must include
generous eligibility criteria), designers also must consider how to
treat the old and the young. The existence of Social Security’s
OASI program complicates the treatment of the elderly. In light
of OASI, we can anticipate at least two potential arguments for
excluding senior citizens—one principled and one pragmatic. The
principled argument is that a UBI would largely be duplicative of
the basic income that OASI already provides: allowing seniors to
continue receiving OASI while phasing out other welfare programs unfairly advantages seniors over other current
162

See id at *19–20.
See, for example, Murray, In Our Hands at 7 (cited in note 7); Stern with Kravitz,
Raising the Floor at 201 (cited in note 9); Yang, The War on Normal People at 166 (cited
in note 135).
164 See Hughes, Fair Shot at 111–14 (cited in note 8).
165 See French Elections, National Service, and Queens at War 30:45–32:40 (Vox: The
Weeds, Apr 26, 2017), available at https://www.stitcher.com/podcast/voxs-the-weeds/e/
french-elections-national-service-and-queens-at-war-49967422 (visited Jan 25, 2020)
(Perma archive unavailable).
163
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beneficiaries of transfer programs. The pragmatic argument is
that excluding the 52.7 million Americans who receive OASI benefits from a UBI would reduce the cost of a new basic income program significantly.166 Notably, senior citizens are excluded from
the existing cash-transfer program most similar to a UBI—the
federal EITC—unless they have a qualifying child in their household,167 presumably because policymakers view the EITC to be duplicative of OASI.
We find the arguments for automatically excluding all senior
citizens from a UBI to be unpersuasive. Social Security has not
brought the problem of elder poverty to an end. The sixty-fiveand-older demographic has the lowest poverty rate of any age
group, but still, 9.3 percent of senior citizens fell below the poverty line in 2016.168 And while the average monthly Social Security benefit for retired workers and their dependents as of December 2017—$1,404—would put an individual above the poverty
line, 169 some beneficiaries receive substantially less than that,
and approximately 4 percent of senior citizens will never receive
Social Security benefits.170 Excluding senior citizens whose OASI
benefits are less than the UBI amount would seem arbitrary and
would be difficult to justify.
One potential solution—suggested by Murray—is to give senior citizens an either-or choice between OASI benefits and a
UBI.171 While that approach would surely cut costs, it also could
leave some seniors substantially worse off than under the status
quo. The most recent data indicates that approximately

166 For the number of Americans receiving OASI benefits, see Social Security Administration, Social Security Beneficiary Statistics: Number of Beneficiaries Receiving Benefits
on December 31, 1970–2018, archived at https://perma.cc/PM8Z-ZVDM.
167 See IRC § 32(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii)(II).
168 See US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2016 and 2017 Annual Social
and Economic Supplements: Table 3: People in Poverty by Selected Characteristics: 2015
and 2016, archived at https://perma.cc/UU29-Z346. The figure was 18.0 percent for children under the age of eighteen and 11.6 percent for adults ages eighteen to sixty-four. Id.
169 See Social Security Administration, Fast Facts & Figures About Social Security,
2018 *16 (Sept 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/QNT9-R7X6.
170 This never-beneficiary population consists primarily of infrequent workers and
late-arriving immigrants. See Kevin Whitman, Gayle L. Reznik, and Dave Shoffner, Who
Never Receives Social Security Benefits?, 71 Soc Sec Bull 17, 20 (May 2011), archived at
https://perma.cc/CR5Z-RF9S.
171 See Murray, In Our Hands at 109 (cited in note 7) (describing the “simplest solution” for transitioning to a UBI as offering a choice between the current system and a UBI).
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4.8 million individuals over age sixty-five receive SNAP benefits;172 about 2.4 million receive SSI benefits;173 and approximately
500,000 live in Section 8–subsidized units.174 Eliminating these
programs and replacing them with a UBI that many low-income
senior citizens choose not to take because it is less than their
OASI benefit could leave some seniors worse off than under the
status quo. 175 Moreover, requiring senior citizens to choose between OASI and a UBI would effectively impose a much higher
marginal tax rate on OASI benefits than other income sources—
an outcome that will grate at seniors who see OASI benefits as
something that they have “paid for” already.176 We suspect that
many of those same individuals would view a choice between
OASI benefits and a UBI as an unfair choice between something
that they have earned and something that others receive
automatically.
Another option would be to include senior citizens within the
UBI while also ending the tax-favored treatment of Social Security benefits.177 Those two changes are nowhere near offsetting:
extending a $500-a-month UBI to 52.7 million OASI recipients
would cost about $316 billion a year, while ending the tax-favored
treatment of Social Security benefits would save only around
$38 billion a year.178 The combination of changes does, however,
172 See SNAP Helps Millions of Low-Income Seniors *1 (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, Apr 26, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/N9HZ-BYMR.
173 See Social Security Administration, SSI Annual Statistical Report, 2018 *21 tbl 3
(Sept 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/8WH6-8L2S.
174 See Demographic Facts: Residents Living in Public Housing *1 (National Center
for Health in Public Housing, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/K8YX-AW6Z.
175 For example, the hypothetical household that the US Department of Agriculture
uses to illustrate the SNAP special rules for the elderly and disabled—a two-person household receiving $500 per person in Social Security benefits and $200 of pension income,
with $300 in excess medical expenses and $600 in shelter costs—would receive a SNAP
benefit of $205 per month in fiscal year 2020. See US Department of Agriculture, Food
and Nutrition Service, SNAP Special Rules for the Elderly or Disabled, archived at
https://perma.cc/Z5PX-5WPL. A $500 per month UBI with an either-or choice between
OASI benefits and the UBI would not affect the household’s cash income, so the loss of
$205 in SNAP benefits would be effectively uncompensated.
176 See, for example, A. Gandara, Letter, Americans Who Paid into Social Security
Deserve to Get Their Contributions Back (Las Vegas Rev-J, June 22, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/JK8R-73K6 (“If you paid in, no matter your income, you should be able to
collect.”).
177 See IRC § 86 (providing that 15–50 percent of social security benefits, depending
on income, are excluded from taxable income).
178 See US Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Tax Expenditures *34
tbl 3 (Oct 16, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/24AG-TPH4 (fiscal year 2019 estimate).
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neutralize the objection to treating OAS benefits differently from
other income streams that might arise if senior citizens were put
to an either-or choice.
The treatment of children also has proven to be controversial
among UBI proponents. To be sure, the notion that children
should be beneficiaries of redistribution should be shared by almost all welfarists and resource egalitarians, and most libertarian justifications for redistribution apply to children as well.179
Reflecting these notions, children have historically been viewed
as among the most deserving recipients of government aid, and
most current social programs favor families with children. The
minimal aid to childless adults provided by the EITC180—arguably
the most UBI-like program in the United States—exemplifies this
judgment. Moreover, as one of us has noted elsewhere, a UBI that
excluded children and was funded through the elimination of existing cash and near-cash transfers would potentially make the
problem of child poverty even graver than it already is.181
What then, are the arguments against including children?
Murray has argued against extending a UBI to children on the

The Congressional Budget Office projects a slightly smaller yield ($34 billion in fiscal year
2020). See Congressional Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028
*242 (Dec 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/8UXW-K9JP. The discrepancy is sufficiently
small that it will not substantially affect any of our big-picture estimates in Part III.F.
179 Some libertarian theorists, however, argue that children are not yet autonomous
individuals whose consent is needed in a just society. For a fuller discussion of libertarianism and the treatment of children under a UBI, see Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L
Rev at 1253–56 (cited in note 17).
180 See Elaine Maag, Who Benefits from Expanding the EITC or CTC? Understanding
the Intersection of the EITC and CTC at the Household Level *4 (Urban Institute, July 30,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/3DS5-LLX2.
181 Consider how a single parent with two children fares under proposals for a basic
income of $1,000 a month per adult as compared to the current system:
[M]any families [living in poverty] receive more than $12,000 in federal benefits
already. SNAP, which covers approximately 45 million Americans, provides a
maximum benefit of $6,132 per year for a family of three and an average benefit
of around $4,500. The maximum earned income tax credit (EITC) for a parent
with two children is $5,572 per year, and the maximum child tax credit is $1,000
per child per year. [Note: $2,000 per year following the December 2017 tax law]
. . . For a single-parent family of three eligible for the average SNAP benefit,
close to the maximum EITC, and [receiving] some combination of other federal
“welfare” programs, . . . to eliminate these benefits and replace them with a
$12,000-a-year UBI would actually lower the floor.
Hemel, Book Review, Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth (cited in note 43). In contrast, the same family would receive a total of $18,000 a year from a basic income of $500
a month per person including children.
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grounds that doing so would amount to a fertility incentive for
low-income adults.182 The empirical literature on the responsiveness of childbearing decisions to fertility incentives yields mixed
results,183 but even accepting the empirical premise that extending a UBI to children would encourage low-income parents to
have more kids, it is not clear that we should consider that to be
undesirable. For example, resource egalitarians might argue that
adults with substantial material resources on account of inheritance or luck already have the luxury of choosing how many children to have without worrying overly about resource constraints;
why should the same not be extended to adults with less income
or wealth?184 Welfarists, for their part, have been engaged in a robust decades-long debate about optimal population size—a debate
that we relegate to the margins but that will shape the views of
some as to whether fertility incentives embedded in a UBI are
desirable or not.185
182

See Murray, In Our Hands at 44–47 (cited in note 7).
Compare, for example, Kevin Milligan, Subsidizing the Stork: New Evidence on
Tax Incentives and Fertility, 87 Rev Econ & Stat 539, 541–43 (2005) (finding a strong effect
on fertility when the Canadian province of Quebec introduced a policy that paid up to CAD
$8,000 to families for having children), with Jeff Grogger and Stephen G. Bronars, The
Effect of Welfare Payments on the Marriage and Fertility Behavior of Unwed Mothers: Results from a Twins Experiment, 109 J Pol Econ 529, 540–42 (2001) (finding smaller effects
from fertility incentives embedded in US welfare policies).
184 Several caveats are in order. First, we assume that a UBI in the range of $500 to
$1,000 per month that extends to children would offset some of the financial burden of
having more kids, but it probably would not make childbirth profitable (in the sense of
leaving the parent in a more comfortable financial position than if she did not have an
additional child). Second, we are keenly aware of the fact that even high-income adults do
not necessarily get to choose the number of children they have. A variety of factors too
numerous to list exhaustively here—including but not limited to infertility, adoption restrictions, multiple births, and unplanned pregnancies among individuals who object to or
lack access to abortion—can cause individuals to have fewer or more children than they
would desire.
185 The “classical utilitarian” perspective posits that the social planner’s objective
should be to maximize the sum of utilities across the population. That might suggest that
we should encourage adults to have more children as long as the lives of those children
would be sufficiently comfortable that their utility is positive. The “average utilitarian”
perspective posits that the social planner should strive to maximize the average utility of
members of the population. The implications of the average utilitarian perspective are
ambiguous, though it too could militate in favor of a pro–population growth policy if each
individual adds more to the available pool of resources than she consumes. See Douglas
A. Wolf, et al, Fiscal Externalities of Becoming a Parent, 37 Population & Dev Rev 241,
241–43, 249–51 (2011). A third perspective, “critical-level utilitarianism,” supports population expansion up to the point that the utility of an additional member exceeds some
threshold level α. Depending on a number of factors, critical-level utilitarianism may support policies that incentivize or disincentivize fertility. For an overview and analysis, see
183
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Aside from fertility considerations, others have argued
against extending a UBI to children on administrative grounds.
For example, Stern writes: “[J]ust think of all the issues that
come up when you try to get your mind around giving [a basic
income] to a ten-year-old.” 186 We find this argument puzzling.
Just as the child tax credit is paid to the child’s parent rather
than to the child, we anticipate that the UBI would go to the
child’s guardian. Granted, in some cases, there will be questions
about which adult should qualify as a particular child’s guardian,
though such questions already arise in the child tax credit and
EITC contexts.187 While in no sense have the child tax credit and
the EITC fully resolved the question of whose child is whose, neither has the challenge of matching children to parents paralyzed
either program.
Because we find the arguments for including children to be
much more persuasive than the arguments against, our view is
that children should be included within a UBI. At that point, the
tax system’s labyrinthine set of supports for families with children (the child tax credit,188 the child and dependent care credit,189
the exclusion for dependent care assistance programs,190 and the
implicit subsidy for single parents embedded in the head-ofhousehold filing status191) all could be laid to rest. This is one more
way in which a UBI could be used to achieve substantial simplification of benefits.192
generally Thomas I. Renström and Luca Spataro, The Optimum Growth Rate for Population Under Critical-Level Utilitarianism, 24 J Population Econ 1181 (2011).
186 Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 204 (cited in note 9).
187 See, for example, Leslie Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing Realities of
Being Poor, 4 J Tax Admin 71, 86–87 (2018); Elaine Maag, H. Elizabeth Peters, and Sara
Edelstein, Increasing Family Complexity and Volatility: The Difficulty in Determining
Child Tax Benefits *6–8 (Tax Policy Center, Mar 3, 2016), archived at https://
perma.cc/XDM8-E3N3.
188 See IRC § 24.
189 See IRC § 21.
190 See IRC § 129.
191 See Jacob Goldin and Zachary Liscow, Beyond Head of Household: Rethinking the
Taxation of Single Parents, 71 Tax L Rev 367, 373–74 (2018).
192 Replacing the various child-targeted tax provisions with a UBI also reduces, but
does not entirely eliminate, the challenge of matching children with the most appropriate
adult to receive the benefit on their behalf. The existing EITC generates incentives to shift
qualifying children from one household to another so that the adult who would receive the
largest credit from claiming the child does so. Since a UBI does not vary with earned income in the same manner, a UBI reduces this incentive. And while intrafamily conflicts
would still arise over which adult should be able to claim a child, an important advantage
of rolling various existing cash and near-cash transfer programs together into a single UBI
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A final—and perhaps the most controversial—eligibility
question concerns the treatment of noncitizens. The welfarist argument for redistribution would seem to apply regardless of
whether the transferee is a citizen: there is little reason to believe
that the marginal utility of income is higher for US citizens than
for lawful permanent residents (Green Card holders) or other immigrants at equivalent income levels. The resource egalitarian
argument for equality of opportunity also brooks no obvious distinction on the basis of nationality. And many of the libertarian
arguments for a UBI would seem to apply with similar force to
noncitizens. Immigrants, too, are separate persons for purposes
of Mack’s argument; the Lockean proviso is not nationality specific; and the public-good benefits of poverty alleviation (for example, alleviation of the aesthetic and moral distress that poverty
brings to the rest of society) would not seem to depend on whether
the poor are citizens or not.193
Even so, there are pragmatic (whether or not persuasive) arguments for limiting a UBI’s scope. First, making the UBI available immediately to new arrivals—regardless of their legal status—might encourage illegal immigration. Second, extending the
UBI to immigrants might make it more politically difficult to lift
restrictions on immigration, because now the fiscal cost of allowing new immigrants to the country would be higher. Third, making the UBI available to immigrants might have effects on who
chooses to come here. Perhaps for these reasons, some cash assistance programs (for example, SSI) and near-cash aid programs
(for example, SNAP) already exclude most new adult arrivals.194

is that families would not have to contend with different child attribution rules under
different programs. So even while a UBI does not eliminate child attribution questions, it
does serve to streamline those determinations.
193 Perhaps some individuals experience greater aesthetic or moral distress when
they observe a fellow citizen in poverty than when they observe a non-US national in
equivalent poverty. We do not share this intuition, though we think it illustrates one of
the challenges for the classical liberal public-goods argument for a UBI: the justification
for a UBI comes to depend upon potentially fickle public opinions rather than on a robust
philosophical basis. See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1226–28 (cited in note 17).
194 Lawful permanent residents who arrived in the United States after August 1996
generally must work for ten years or must serve in the military before they become eligible
for SNAP and SSI (though children under the age of eighteen are eligible for SNAP, as are
various categories of refugees). See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Service, SNAP Policy on Non-Citizen Eligibility (Sept 4, 2013), archived at
https://perma.cc/N2K3-DXZW; Social Security Administration, Spotlight on SSI Benefits
for Aliens—2019 Edition, archived at https://perma.cc/4PMQ-W3FK.
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A reasonable compromise, we think, is to extend a UBI to
lawful permanent residents but to exclude other noncitizens.
Once the country has concluded that a person may remain here
permanently, we see little reason to exclude that person from our
community of concern. And because a lawful permanent resident
must—by definition—come by that status lawfully, it seems unlikely that the extension of a UBI to lawful permanent residents
would encourage individuals to cross the border illegally or overstay a visa. The exclusion of undocumented immigrants—including “Dreamers”—from a UBI may strike many readers as harsh,
though we note that such individuals already cannot qualify for
SNAP, Medicaid, DI, SSI, and many other cash and near-cash
benefits.195 We think these concerns are best addressed through
reforms to the immigration laws, though we acknowledge that
this outcome is easier said than legislatively done.196
C.

Uniformity: Equal Benefits for All

The claim that every citizen and lawful permanent resident
should receive a UBI does not necessarily imply that all should
receive the same amount. Here, we consider whether benefits
should be uniform or whether they should vary on the basis of
household size, assets, and geography.
1. A UBI should be implemented on a per-person rather
than a per-household basis.
Some UBI proposals contemplate that each individual will receive the same amount; others envision an adjustment for household size (that is, a two-person household would receive less than

195 See Maria Santana, 5 Immigration Myths Debunked (CNNMoney, Nov 20, 2014),
archived at https://perma.cc/UWR8-7L2K. Undocumented immigrant children are eligible
to attend public schools; undocumented immigrants do receive emergency medical assistance; and undocumented immigrants may receive a limited set of additional in-kind benefits through, for example, the National School Lunch Program; Special Supplemental
Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); and Head Start. See Tara
Watson, Do Undocumented Immigrants Overuse Government Benefits? (EconoFact, Mar
28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SFA7-4VBX.
196 A separate question concerns the 9 million or so US citizens living abroad. See US
Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Consular Affairs by the Numbers (Dec
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/TFH7-3K2V. The decision to exclude those citizens
abroad from a UBI might be justified on the grounds that many are eligible for substantial
benefits in the countries in which they live, and so layering a UBI on top of that would
amount to a sort of “double payment.”
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double the amount that a single person receives, and a threeperson household would receive less than 1.5 times the amount
that a two-person household receives).197 While there is a plausible argument in favor of adjusting the UBI on the basis of household size, we ultimately conclude that the case for a per-person
UBI is more compelling.
The nub of the argument for a household size adjustment is
that household size affects ability to pay. Having a roommate—or
a spouse—generally reduces per-person housing costs. The bill for
groceries to feed two people is generally less than double the bill
for one. And so on. The square-root scale often used in studies of
income inequality and poverty implicitly assumes that the cost of
living for two people is 1.41 times the cost of living for a single
person (that is, doubling up saves approximately 30 percent), and
that the cost of living for four people is twice the cost of living for
a single person (that is, “quadrupling up” saves 50 percent).198
The arguments against a household size adjustment are several. Consider a UBI in which individuals living alone receive a
$12,000 UBI while married or cohabitating individuals receive
$8,000 each ($16,000 per couple). 199 This structure creates an
$8,000 penalty for childless adults who wed.200 Welfarists might
emphasize that household size adjustments distort decisions to
marry and cohabitate. Resource egalitarians might argue that the
neutrality principle suggests that society should not reward or
penalize individuals for household formation choices. Libertarians, too, might value the fact that a UBI is invariant to household
size: a per-person rather than per-household UBI does less to
197 Compare Murray, In Our Hands at 8–9 (cited in note 7) (not adjusting for household size), with Jessica Wiederspan, Elizabeth Rhodes, and H. Luke Shaefer, Expanding
the Discourse on Antipoverty Policy: Reconsidering a Negative Income Tax, 19 J Poverty
218, 229 tbl 3 (2015) (adjusting for household size). Existing welfare programs generally
adjust for household size, as did the early negative income tax proposals from the 1960s
and 1970s. See, for example, Asimow and Klein, 8 Harv J Legis at 28–29 (cited in note 14);
Popkin, 78 Yale L J at 403–11 (cited in note 14); Tobin, Pechman, and Mieszkowski, 77
Yale L J at 4–5 (cited in note 14); Comment, 78 Yale L J at 276–77 (cited in note 14).
198 See What are Equivalence Scales? *2 (OECD Project on Income Distribution and
Poverty), archived at https://perma.cc/7W3F-GMD4.
199 This is similar to one scenario suggested by Jessica Wiederspan and collaborators
in which each household would receive a UBI equal to the federal poverty level. See
Wiederspan, Rhodes, and Shaefer, 19 J Poverty at 222, 229–30 (cited in note 197). The
federal poverty level as of 2017 was $12,752 for a single person household under age sixtyfive and $16,414 for a two-person household under age sixty-five. See Fontenot, Semega,
and Kollar, Current Population Reports at *47 (cited in note 138).
200 The arithmetic is straightforward: $12,000 × 2 − $16,000 = $8,000.
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intrude upon core decisions in an individual’s life.201 Readers with
a range of philosophical commitments also may appreciate the independence that an individual UBI grants to household members;
for example, a per-person UBI delivered as a biweekly check to
each eligible adult may make it easier for a spouse to leave an
abusive relationship.202
Another argument against a downward adjustment for individuals living in larger households—one that sounds in a welfarist register—builds on an important 1996 paper by Professor
Louis Kaplow.203 Kaplow’s insight is that larger households likely
enjoy economies of scale, and so may be better off than smaller
households with the same per-person income, but that this does
not necessarily mean that the marginal utility of income is lower
for larger households because larger households have a greater
ability to share resources.204 To illustrate: A two-person household
likely needs only one microwave oven, one refrigerator, one washing machine, one Roku box, and so on. Thus, A and B, who each
earn $50,000 and live together, may be better off than C, who
earns $50,000 and lives alone, because A and B can share their
microwave, refrigerator, washing machine, Roku box, etc., and
spend more on other items. And we generally think that betteroff individuals have a lower marginal utility of income. Yet if A
and B buy a new microwave, refrigerator, washing machine, or
Roku box, both of them can use it, whereas if C buys a household
item, only C benefits. Thus, it is not clear whether social welfare
is increased by transferring $30 (roughly the cost of a Roku box)
from A and B to C. C arguably “needs” the money more, but A and
B arguably can make better use of it.

201 In separate work, one of us has argued that the principle of “marriage neutrality”
carries limited normative force. See generally Daniel Hemel, Beyond the Marriage Tax
Trilemma, 54 Wake Forest L Rev *101 (forthcoming 2020), archived at https://
perma.cc/MKJ9-5434. Insofar as “singles bonuses” or “marriage penalties” might be justified, however, they can be implemented through the tax system rather than through adjustments to the UBI.
202 Some may also believe symbolic reasons counsel in favor of casting the UBI as an
individual benefit. As described in Part II, some of the strongest justifications for a UBI
are rooted in concern for individuals as such. Consider libertarianism, under which a UBI
shows respect for the separateness of persons, legitimates private property rights by ensuring the Lockean proviso is met with respect to all, and provides a basis for all individuals to consent to a system of private property rights. Styling the UBI as an individual
benefit acknowledges the autonomy of all individuals.
203 Louis Kaplow, Optimal Distribution and the Family, 98 Scand J Econ 75 (1996).
204 See id at 89–90.
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Administrative and compliance concerns also weigh against
household-size adjustments. Living arrangements among lowincome individuals are often transitory, with roommates, romantic partners, and relatives moving in and out frequently yet irregularly. Constantly adjusting grant size to reflect these changes
would impose a significant burden on individuals and on whatever agency implements the program.205 And beyond the administrative and compliance costs, a UBI dependent on fluctuating
household size would hamper the ability of low-income individuals to plan for the future. Indeed, the fact that a UBI does not
waver in size is one key advantage of a UBI over existing welfare
programs that deliver benefits less reliably.
Finally, insofar as policymakers decide to make the tax-andtransfer system dependent upon household size, we think it is
much easier to accomplish that objective through tax adjustments
than through transfer adjustments. The IRS can (and does) collect information on household size once a year, and the tax system
adjusts for household size in a number of ways (for example, filing
status). Implementing these adjustments through changes to biweekly or monthly UBI payments strikes us as an unnecessarily
complicated and costly endeavor.
2. A UBI should not depend on assets.
A UBI should not, in our view, depend on an asset test. This
recommendation may surprise some. If the goal of a UBI is to redistribute from haves to have-nots, then an asset test initially appears to make sense.206 If A and B each have incomes of $3,000 a
year, but A has $10,000 sitting in the bank while B has no

205 Indeed, the difficulty of applying household-size rules is one oft-cited problem with
the federal EITC. See Robert Greenstein, John Wancheck, and Chuck Marr, Reducing
Overpayments in the Earned Income Tax Credit *3 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
Jan 31, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/6ND2-E4WP (citing the Treasury Department’s estimate that “70 percent of EITC improper payments stem from issues related to
the EITC’s [complicated] residency and relationship requirements”).
206 Many scholars make a similar argument in favor of taxing wealth in addition to
income. See, for example, Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The
Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 Tax L Rev 1, 58–59 (2009); Liam Murphy,
Why Does Inequality Matter? Reflections on the Political Morality of Piketty’s Capital in
the Twenty-First Century, 68 Tax L Rev 613, 628 (2015); David Shakow and Reed
Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L Rev 499, 500 (2000). But see Miranda
Perry Fleischer, Not So Fast: The Hidden Difficulties of Taxing Wealth, in Jack Knight
and Melissa Schwartzberg, eds, Wealth: Nomos LVIII 261, 275–85 (NYU 2017) (discussing
concerns such as valuation and constitutionality with administering a wealth tax).

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

683

savings, then A seems better able to fend for himself than B, and
arguably should merit less assistance.
Several considerations counsel against conditioning a UBI on
assets, however. One is administrative: while we already have a
well-developed third-party reporting apparatus for measuring individual and household income, our administrative technologies
for appraising individual and household wealth are much less sophisticated. A second is liquidity related: illiquid assets may do
relatively little to improve an individual’s ability to pay in the
short term. Both the administrative and liquidity concerns can be
allayed through an asset test that depends solely on easy-to-value
liquid assets (for example, cash, checking and savings accounts,
and stocks and bonds traded on active markets), but that, in turn,
would incentivize individuals to transmute their wealth into less
liquid forms (for example, life insurance policies and gold bars).
Anecdotally, some welfare recipients report buying more household durables such as furniture (which is not counted in asset
tests for most existing welfare programs) for precisely this purpose.207 Some low-income individuals who wish to save might also
eschew banks and instead simply stockpile cash if they knew that
bank account balances would count against them for UBI purposes. This incentive would only magnify the burdens that lowerincome individuals already face in obtaining traditional financial
services.
An asset test also would distort the choice between presentperiod consumption and saving for the future.208 Such a test would
amount to a new tax on capital income, likely at a regressive marginal rate (because higher-net-worth individuals who are well
above the asset test threshold would face no marginal tax as a
result).209 This strikes us as entirely backwards. Society arguably
207 See, for example, Matthew Desmond, Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American
City 217–18 (Crown 2016) (describing how one SSI recipient views using layaway to purchase items like furniture and televisions as a logical alternative to savings since having
more than $2,000 in her bank account results in a reduction to her benefits).
208 To be sure, the existing federal income tax does so already insofar as it includes
capital income (interest, dividends, capital gains, etc.). But a number of federal tax provisions offset this distortion by allowing households to save substantial sums in tax-free or
essentially tax-free vehicles (for example, Roth and traditional IRAs, 401(k) plans, lifeinsurance policies, Section 529 plans, and owner-occupied housing).
209 Decreasing one’s benefits as wealth rises is economically equivalent to imposing a
tax on that wealth. Consider a UBI in which benefits decrease by 10 cents for each dollar
of assets owned over $2,000. As long as Oliver’s assets remain under $2,000, he receives a
UBI of, for example, $1,000 a month. But if Oliver manages to save some money and his
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has an interest in encouraging savings among low-income households so that they can weather shocks such as a car breakdown or
an unexpected medical bill.210 We see absolutely no reason, by contrast, why society should effectively discourage low-income households from accumulating savings through what amounts to a regressive wealth tax.
A final consideration is that asset levels often fluctuate dramatically for the poorest individuals and households. The amount
in an individual’s checking account might increase temporarily on
account of a prior landlord returning a security deposit, a tax refund, a one-time bonus, student loans, or a range of other possible
events. Low-income individuals and households may spend these
funds quickly to repay debts or purchase durables.211 Looking at
temporary infusions of cash could lead to a reduction in an individual’s UBI unrelated to any actual change in ability to pay.
Again, this “churn” in eligibility may interfere with the ability of
individuals to plan their lives.212
Our view on an asset test for a UBI should not be interpreted
as a verdict on capital income and wealth taxes more generally.
While we think that there are strong arguments in favor of a progressive consumption tax that effectively exempts capital income
and imposes no tax on wealth, our case against an asset test does
not depend upon that premise.213 The most straightforward way
to tax capital income or wealth would be through the tax system—
not through an administratively messy mechanism that has the
effect of taxing wealth at regressive rates.
assets increase to $2,100, his monthly benefit decreases by $10. For every $100 of wealth,
he has $10 less and the government has $10 more. This is the very definition of a wealth
tax. Cliff-like limits are even worse, imposing the equivalent of wealth taxes that exceed
100 percent. Consider a family that loses several hundred dollars of SNAP benefits each
month because their countable assets climb above $2,250, the household “resource limit”
to be eligible for SNAP in FY 2018. Memorandum from Silbermann, SNAP — Fiscal Year
2018 at *1 (cited in note 147). A few dollars of increased wealth can lead to a loss of hundreds of dollars’ worth of benefits.
210 See Do Limits on Family Assets Affect Participation in, Costs of TANF? (The Pew
Charitable Trusts, July 7, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/X4M9-6W45. See also
Rebecca Vallas and Joe Valenti, Asset Limits Are a Barrier to Economic Security and Mobility *3–4 (Center for American Progress, Sept 10, 2014), archived at https://
perma.cc/VHP9-X2E7.
211 See Do Limits on Family Assets Affect Participation in, Costs of TANF? at *3 (cited
in note 210).
212 Id.
213 See generally, for example, Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 Stan L Rev 1413 (2006).
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3. A UBI should not vary by location.
A third dimension along which the size of a UBI might vary
is geography: Should a UBI be adjusted for geographic differences
in the cost of living? Our view is that the size of a UBI should be
uniform regardless of where in the United States one lives, and
we think that this view can be defended on welfarist, resource
egalitarian, and libertarian grounds. It also comports with the
overall approach throughout most of the Internal Revenue Code,
which in general is geographically neutral.214 Federal policy is,
however, somewhat inconsistent on this front: certain federal
benefits—such as the Affordable Care Act premium tax credit215
and Section 8 housing choice vouchers 216 —vary by location, as
does the federal government’s pay scale.217
The welfarist argument in favor of geographic adjustments is
that location is an indicator of need. For example, according to
research by scholars at MIT, a single adult in San Francisco needs
more than $42,000218 to cover basic expenses such as food, medical
care, housing, transportation, and taxes, whereas a single adult
in Illinois’s Cook County (which encompasses Chicago) can scrape
by on just over $28,000. 219 The higher cost of living in San
Francisco might on first glance seem to justify a larger UBI for
individuals living there.
The welfarist response is at least twofold. First, where one
lives is at least to some extent a matter of choice: the individual
214 The rate tables, personal exemption amount, and standard deduction have never
varied based on location, and the EITC and child tax credit do not depend on geography
either. Some provisions—such as the deduction for state and local taxes (SALT), see IRC
§ 164—benefit taxpayers in certain jurisdictions more than others, but the SALT provision
does not formally discriminate on the basis of location. Two notable exceptions are the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit, see IRC § 42(d)(5)(B), and the newly enacted “opportunity
zone” provision, see IRC § 1400Z-2, both of which grant favorable treatment to investments in certain census tracts.
215 See IRC § 36B (tying the credit amount to the premiums for health insurance on
the state-established exchanges in the taxpayer’s state).
216 See US Department of Housing and Urban Development, Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, archived at https://perma.cc/4LM5-DVPC (stating that housing choice
voucher amounts are based on the cost of housing in the “local housing market”).
217 See US Office of Personnel Management, Pay & Leave: Salaries & Wages: 2018
General Schedule (GS) Locality Pay Tables, archived at https://perma.cc/MUR3-X494 (listing different pay tables for different geographic areas).
218 See Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage Calculation for San Francisco County,
California (Living Wage Calculator), archived at https://perma.cc/8SNX-BYF7.
219 See Amy K. Glasmeier, Living Wage Calculation for Cook County, Illinois (Living
Wage Calculator), archived at https://perma.cc/8ZM5-D2Z8.
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who chooses to live in San Francisco may value mild winters and
views of the Golden Gate Bridge more than the individual who
chooses to live in Chicago. Insofar as location is a matter of choice,
then the individual who lives in San Francisco is not necessarily
needier than the Chicagoan but rather has different consumption
priorities. To be sure, choice of location is also constrained by
other factors. The average American lives only eighteen miles
from her mother—suggesting that location is importantly a function of birthplace and family ties220—and interstate migration has
been on the decline for several decades.221 A UBI, though, would
plausibly lower barriers to migration by enabling more individuals to afford moving costs as well as childcare and eldercare costs
associated with living away from extended families.
Second, even if location is not freely chosen, the fact that the
San Franciscan faces a higher cost of living than the Chicagoan
does not necessarily mean that the San Franciscan’s marginal
utility of income is higher as well. A San Franciscan earning
$30,000 a year might be materially worse off than a Chicagoan
earning the same amount, and for that reason the San Franciscan
might prize an additional dollar somewhat more, but it is also the
case that a dollar goes further in Chicago than in San Francisco.
Thus, it is unclear whether the marginal utility of income is
higher for the San Franciscan or the Chicagoan earning the same
amount, and insofar as the welfarist case for redistribution is
predicated upon differential marginal utilities of income, the argument for redistributing more to the San Franciscan is ambiguous at best. Add in the administrative costs of locational adjustments and the argument for a geographically differentiated UBI
becomes rather weak.
For the resource egalitarian, meanwhile, the case for geographic adjustments arguably depends upon whether location
should be considered a matter of choice or of chance. If the former,
then the neutrality principle would suggest that society should
not grant a larger benefit to individuals with a taste for mild winters and views of the Golden Gate Bridge—as expensive as those

220 See Quoctrung Bui and Claire Cain Miller, The Typical American Lives Only 18
Miles from Mom (NY Times, Dec 23, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/A4R7-RRY9.
221 See Raven Molloy, Christopher L. Smith, and Abigail Wozniak, Job Changing
and the Decline in Long-Distance Migration in the United States, 54 Demography 631,
633 fig 1 (2017).
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tastes might be to satisfy.222 If the latter, then perhaps we should
think of being born in the San Francisco Bay Area as a chance
event that raises the amount of income that one needs in order to
function as an equal citizen. On this view, individuals unlucky
enough to be born into high cost-of-living areas might have a
claim to a larger UBI.
Yet even if location is a matter of chance rather than choice,
the resource egalitarian argument for redistributing more to individuals in high cost-of-living areas is uncertain. The cost of living tends to be higher in areas with greater employment opportunities and higher wages.223 Should we think of the San Francisco
Bay Area native as unlucky to have been born in a high cost-ofliving area, or lucky to have been born in an area with an unemployment rate that is 1.1 percentage points below the national
rate and average weekly wages that exceed the national average
by more than 76 percent?224 Should redistribution be targeted at
individuals who by chance land in areas with high wages and a
high cost of living, or low wages and a low cost of living? The question illustrates the reality that even if cost-of-living adjustments
are attractive in theory, they are challenging to implement in
practice.225
From a libertarian perspective, the case for cost-of-living adjustments is especially weak. Cost-of-living adjustments effectively reward localities that—through stringent zoning regulations—drive up housing costs. 226 The idea of the federal
government subsidizing exclusionary local regulations should be
anathema to most libertarians. Cost-of-living adjustments also
222 For more on expensive tastes, see Alstott, 121 Harv L Rev at 478–85 (cited in note
54); Fleischer, 91 BU L Rev at 630–31 (cited in note 54).
223 On the relationship between wages and cost of living across urban areas, see generally Wendell Cox, The Center for Opportunity Urbanism (COU) Standard of Living Index, 3rd Annual Edition (Dec 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/R6GA-A9K8.
224 See US Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, San Francisco Area Economic Summary *1 (Oct 2, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/QAK3-93KA.
225 The Center for Opportunity Urbanism seeks to measure the standard of living
across urban areas by adjusting the real average wage for the cost of living. San Jose,
California—with high costs but also high wages—comes in first place in this ranking (indicating that workers there can afford more material goods and services than workers
elsewhere). See Cox, COU Standard of Living Index at *11 tbl 1 (cited in note 223). San
Francisco places in the top third. The implication is that larger UBIs for individuals in
high-cost-of-living areas might redistribute in the wrong direction (that is, from individuals in places where job prospects are bleak to individuals in places where high-wage employment opportunities are more plentiful).
226 See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, and Raven E. Saks, Why Have Housing
Prices Gone Up?, 95 Am Econ Rev 329, 332–33 (2005).
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favor individuals with expensive geographic preferences relative
to individuals who would prefer to spend less on housing and
more on other goods and services. Libertarians who believe that
individuals should determine on their own what trade-offs to
make are likely to chafe at the notion that the government should
give a larger amount to those who choose to live on the island of
Manhattan rather than in Manhattan, Kansas.
D. Assignability: Beneficiaries Should Have a Limited Ability
to Borrow Against Future Payments
One largely overlooked but critically important implementation issue concerns the assignability of future UBI benefits.
Should individuals be allowed to post their future UBI benefits as
collateral for a loan or to trade those benefits away in a reverseannuity transaction? To illustrate: Imagine that an individual
faces a sudden and unexpected expense (for example, a bill for
medical care or car repair) and lacks the cash on hand to make
the payment. Should she be able to, say, borrow $5,800 today and
assign her next twelve UBI payments to the lender (roughly the
equivalent of borrowing at a 6.3 percent interest rate)?227 If so, financial institutions presumably would offer individuals the opportunity to trade their rights to UBI benefits in the future for a
lump sum today. The result would be that individuals could convert periodic payments into something similar to the stakeholder
grants suggested by Professors Ackerman and Alstott.228
From a welfarist perspective, the question of assignability is
especially challenging. On the one hand, welfarists might be concerned about individuals taking out large loans early in life and
then squandering their lump sums on unsuccessful investments
or imprudent personal purchases. On the other hand, assignability—and the loans that it would facilitate—could expand credit
access for millions of Americans who might use the lump-sum
amounts to, say, start a business or pay college tuition. And as
compared to alternatives such as payday loans or large credit card
balances, borrowing against future UBI payments might allow
low-income individuals to secure significantly lower interest

227 We chose the $5,800 figure arbitrarily. Presumably, lenders would offer an amount
less than the nominal sum of future payments to reflect (a) the time value of money and
(b) the risk that the borrower will die before the loan is repaid.
228 See Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 3–5 (cited in note 32).
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rates.229 Predatory lending is a concern either way, but the market for UBI assignment loans may be easier for the government to
regulate because the government effectively controls the collateral.
For resource egalitarians, the question of assignability seems
somewhat more straightforward. The choice-chance principle arguably suggests that if an individual freely chooses to trade UBI
payments in the future for a lump sum today, society is under no
obligation to bail that individual out if she later regrets the decision. The neutrality principle, moreover, suggests that the government should not intervene to favor those who choose to save
over those who choose to borrow.
For libertarians committed to the value of individual freedom, the idea of allowing UBI recipients to decide whether to assign their future benefits might seem quite attractive. On the
other hand, minimal-state libertarians who believe in a UBI as a
way to ensure that no indigent individuals are “faultlessly” poor
might wonder whether we hold individuals at fault for decisions
they made years or decades in the past. Meanwhile, Friedman’s
public-goods argument for a UBI leads us to ask whether nonindigent members of society will experience moral or aesthetic distress when they see their fellow citizens living in abject poverty if
they know that those living in poverty had the option of a stable
UBI and yet squandered it.
Assignability also interacts with longevity in interesting and
potentially significant ways. Presumably, financial institutions
will make lump-sum offers based on their projections of the recipient’s life span. The financial institution will stand to lose on individuals who live shorter-than-expected lives and gain on individuals who live longer-than-expected lives. Within the reverseannuity risk pool, we will see a sort of redistribution from the longlived to the short-lived (similar to a whole life insurance risk pool,
and the opposite of what occurs in a traditional-annuity risk pool).
Some egalitarians may see this as desirable because it partially
compensates the short-lived for their bad luck. Welfarists may be
concerned because the marginal utility of an additional dollar is
presumably higher the longer one will live, and in this respect reverse annuities amount to a transfer in the wrong direction.

229 To be sure, individuals could use their UBI benefits to make loan payments regardless of whether UBI rights are assignable. The advantage of assignability is that the
additional security would likely lead lenders to offer much lower interest rates than they
would for unsecured loans.
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We do not have a fully satisfactory answer to the assignability question, but we offer a tentative suggestion: a rule that allows
adults over the age of eighteen to assign benefits for a limited period (for example, twelve months) in exchange for a loan. The oneyear allowance would go some way toward expanding credit access for low-income individuals without generating the risk that
some older Americans might be relegated to deep poverty on account of imprudent decisions that they made in their youth. UBI
pilot programs can shed further light on this question by randomly assigning recipients to treatment and control groups that
either can or cannot assign their benefits and then comparing outcomes. One year is an admittedly arbitrary figure, and further
study might reveal evidence that weighs in favor of expanding or
contracting that period.
While our suggestions are tentative, our firmer conclusion is
that assignability—though rarely discussed—will be central to
UBI design.230 No matter the size, a freely assignable UBI will not
eradicate poverty entirely because some individuals will assign
their UBIs away. On the other hand, a UBI with a prohibition on
assignment reproduces some of the same paternalism that UBI
supporters often point to as a flaw of our current welfare state.
Put differently: If the goal is to ensure a subsistence-level income
for all Americans, then a freely assignable UBI will not accomplish that end.231 If the goal is to increase financial opportunities
for all Americans and then to let them chart their own course
through life, then free assignability would seem to be the better
approach. The question of assignability brings to the foreground
philosophical differences among UBI proponents of various
stripes.

230 A related question is whether to allow garnishment of a UBI for back taxes and
child support. The arguments in favor of garnishment are straightforward: Why should
an individual who already owes money to the federal government receive even more? And
why should the federal government abide by a parent’s delinquency in supporting a child?
At the same time, garnishment would mean that a UBI would not in fact lift all individuals
out of deep poverty because some would see most or all of their UBI diverted.
231 For this reason, Professors Van Parijs and Vanderborght argue that beneficiaries
should not be allowed to assign their UBIs. See Van Parijs and Vanderborght, Basic Income at 10 (cited in note 10).
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Payment Mechanism: Direct Deposits on a Biweekly Basis
via the Social Security Administration

Once we have decided that the government ought to provide
a basic income, the question arises: How? That is, how exactly will
payments be made to recipients, how frequently, and by whom?
Direct deposit to a bank account or debit card seems like the
most straightforward method of payment, and just over 99 percent of Social Security beneficiaries receive their payments via
direct deposit already.232 The system is imperfect: the SSA’s Office
of the Inspector General reports that direct deposit payments for
nearly 7,200 beneficiaries—totaling almost $11 million—were
misdirected from 2014 to 2016. 233 But for a program making
roughly $1 trillion a year in payments to more than 60 million
beneficiaries, the payment problems seem like mere hiccups.234
Still, further innovations on top of the existing Social Security payment system may be worthy of consideration. One possibility is to encourage—or even require—parents to set up savings
accounts for their children in order for the children to receive a
basic income, with payments deposited directly to those accounts.
Accounts could be structured such that parents can withdraw
funds to pay expenses for their children until those children reach
age eighteen, at which point the children (now adults) would have
full control over their accounts.235 This could help to reduce the
ranks of the “unbanked” (that is, the portion of the population
that lacks access to accounts at financial institutions).236 A similar
program in Mongolia, which distributes mineral and mining revenues into accounts set up for children under eighteen, 237 has
232 See Social Security Administration, Social Security Administration Beneficiaries:
Social Security Direct Deposit and Check Statistics (Aug 2019), archived at
https://perma.cc/65CM-3MR6.
233 See Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Unauthorized
My Social Security Direct Deposit Changes in Calendar Years 2014 Through 2016 (Aug
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/US6F-NDL3.
234 See Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social
Security Bulletin, 2017 *2–3 (Mar 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/E83H-24F8.
235 Although beyond the scope of this Article, we recognize that this proposal would
require additional rules to address the allocation of access to such accounts when parents
do not live together.
236 On the causes and consequences of being “unbanked,” see Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 Yale J Reg 121, 130–41 (2004).
237 See Leora Klapper, Can Universal Basic Income Boost Financial Inclusion and
Transparency? (Brookings Institute: Future Development, June 15, 2017), archived at
https://perma.cc/68YZ-WA2W.
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contributed to greater financial inclusion in that country than in
the United States on some dimensions. For example, 89 percent
of Mongolian adults in the lower two quintiles of the income distribution had bank accounts in 2014, compared to 87 percent of
American adults in the bottom two quintiles.238 The 2 percentage
point difference between Mongolia and the United States may
seem small, but the statistic is quite striking once one considers
the wide gap in economic and financial development between the
United States (per capita GDP of roughly $63,000) and Mongolia
(per capita GDP of less than $4,200).239
Others have suggested using blockchain technology to power
a basic income program. 240 A nonprofit organization called the
People’s Currency Foundation already has sprung up with the
goal of implementing a blockchain-based UBI.241 We confess to
finding little in this idea to recommend itself, as a blockchainbased UBI would seem to exclude the technologically unsophisticated (and, moreover, the existing direct-deposit system for Social
Security seems to work just fine).
A somewhat more serious (in our view) question is whether
payments should go to individuals whose tax liability far exceeds
their UBI amount. For example, should Jeff Bezos receive a direct
deposit into his bank account even while he withholds thousands
of dollars from his paycheck and makes estimated tax payments
of many millions? The answer matters partly for optics (will support for a UBI be stronger if everyone feels like a beneficiary, or
will Americans view payments to Bezos et al. as a waste?) and
partly for purposes of administrability. We consider the optical
question at greater length in Part IV; from a perspective of administrability, we anticipate that paying the same amount to
every American will be less cumbersome than trying to adjust individual payments on the basis of income.
The question of payment frequency has also divided supporters of unconditional, unrestricted cash transfers. Ackerman and
Alstott have proposed a system whereby individuals would

238 See Asli Demirguc-Kunt, et al, The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring
Financial Inclusion Around the World *84 (World Bank Group Policy Research Working
Paper No 7255, Apr 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/5Q3Q-KDEH.
239 GDP (Current US$) (cited in note 152) (2018 statistics).
240 See, for example, Alicia Naumoff, Why Universal Basic Income Should Be Paid in
Bitcoin (Cointelegraph, Jan 19, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/3KBD-88M7.
241 See About Mannabase (Mannabase), archived at https://perma.cc/GE3M-XN3P.
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receive $80,000—paid out in four annual increments—upon entering college or turning twenty-one, whichever comes first. 242
Others argue for monthly UBI payments—a suggestion in line
with most current UBI proposals.243 Payments could be even more
frequent than that; just as many banks pay interest daily,244 the
government could make daily deposits to UBI recipients’ accounts.
In theory, payment frequency might be of little relevance if
recipients can freely contract with financial institutions. For example, one can annuitize a once-in-a-lifetime lump-sum amount
in order to transform it into a stream of annual or monthly payments; conversely, one can borrow against a future stream of annual or monthly payments in order to obtain a lump-sum amount
today.245 There are, however, at least three aspects of the payment
frequency issue that merit policymakers’ attention.
The first is administrability. Transaction costs increase with
payment frequency. Monitoring costs do as well. Workers who are
paid via direct deposit once every two weeks bear a time cost
when they check their bank accounts to ensure that the payment
came through. Those costs would rise (or the vigilance of monitoring would decline) if payments were made every day.
A second aspect of the frequency question involves consumption smoothing. The stresses of poverty—combined with limited
access to credit and savings vehicles—potentially make it difficult
for households to spread expenditures over a long payment cycle,
with the consequence that spending may be concentrated toward
the beginning of the cycle and households will go without adequate nutrition or other necessities near the end. Substantiating
this concern, economists have observed a “Food Stamp nutrition
cycle,” with caloric intake declining by 10 to 15 percent over the
242

Ackerman and Alstott, The Stakeholder Society at 51–52 (cited in note 32).
Most traditional cash and near-cash transfer programs (such as SNAP, WIC,
TANF, and Social Security) are paid out monthly. See generally, for example, US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Monthly Issuance Schedule for All States and Territories, archived at
https://perma.cc/Z83C-LN6P. Cash transfers implemented through the federal tax system
tend to be distributed annually. Efforts to facilitate more frequent payments to EITC recipients have so far floundered. For a discussion, see generally Steve Holt, Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax Credit Revisited (Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program,
Dec 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/CHN4-5C3H.
244 See, for example, Learn About Savings Accounts (Ally Bank, Aug 1, 2016), archived
at https://perma.cc/D92D-EPU9.
245 See Fleischer and Hemel, 2017 Wis L Rev at 1241–44 (cited in note 17).
243
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course of each month.246 There is also some evidence that stores
respond to this pattern by raising prices on the day that SNAP
beneficiaries receive payments.247 These findings have led to an
emerging view in food-policy circles that more frequent payments
(for example, on a biweekly or semimonthly basis) would improve
outcomes for beneficiaries by allowing them to smooth their
consumption more easily. 248 The counterargument to the
consumption-smoothing case for more frequent payments is that
a longer window between disbursals operates as a “forced savings” mechanism: beneficiaries effectively “save up” for significant durable-goods expenses (for example, cars and washing machines).249 Low-income households—especially those with limited
access to banks or other financial institutions—may otherwise
find it difficult to save for larger expenditures.250
A third aspect of the frequency question is the interaction between payment frequency and longevity. As noted above in our
discussion of assignability, one-time payments tend to favor
shorter-lived individuals while more frequent payments tend to
favor longer-lived individuals.251 That is, if payments are made
each period that one is alive, then longer-lived individuals will
receive more over their lifetimes. If one believes that premature
death is an element of inequality that the government ought to

246 Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp
Nutrition Cycle, 89 J Pub Econ 303, 307–08 (2005). See also Karen S. Hamrick and
Margaret Andrews, SNAP Participants’ Eating Patterns over the Benefit Month: A Time
Use Perspective, 11 PLOS ONE 1, 14 fig 2 (2016) (finding that the probability of not eating
on a given day rises as more time elapses from the receipt of benefits for SNAP recipients).
247 See Justine Hastings and Ebonya Washington, The First of the Month Effect: Consumer Behavior and Store Responses, 2 Am Econ J: Econ Pol 142, 156–59 (2010).
248 See, for example, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Informing Food and Nutrition Assistance Policy: 10 Years of Research at ERS 30
(Dec 2007); Tommy Tobin, Semi-Monthly Benefit Transfers Are a Simple Way to Improve
Food Stamps (Forbes, Apr 23, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4WEN-6PVJ.
249 For a discussion, see Damon Jones, Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit
Participation: Experimental Evidence from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings, 2 Am
Econ J: Applied Econ 147, 149–52 (2010).
250 According to Bureau of Labor Statistics data, more than 56 percent of privatesector businesses pay their employees biweekly or twice a month, and only about 11 percent pay their employees less frequently than biweekly/semimonthly. See Matt Burgess,
How Frequently Do Private Businesses Pay Workers, 3 Beyond the Numbers: Pay & Benefits (May 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/3QWZ-MJSF. If there were widespread demand among employees for less frequent payment, then presumably employers would
economize on transaction costs by reducing payment frequency. However, insofar as payment frequency concerns arise from stresses and constraints unique to lower-income
households, aggregate payroll data is arguably of limited utility.
251 See text following note 229.

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

695

offset through cash payments, then perhaps that is an argument
for one-time payments.
The prevalence of biweekly or semimonthly payment schedules in the private-sector employment context seems to indicate
that individuals prefer relatively regular payment rather than
“forced savings” brought about by payment infrequency. If there
were widespread demand among employees for less frequent payment, then presumably employers would economize on transaction costs by reducing payment frequency. Our own tentative
view is that the government should likely follow the judgment of
the majority of employers who have concluded that disbursals
every other week or twice a month strike a reasonable balance
between administrability and consumption smoothing. We
acknowledge, though, that technological advances that lead to
further reductions in transaction costs might reconfigure that
balance. As for the forced savings counterargument, our hope is
that a UBI via direct deposit will expand financial access, allowing low-income individuals to utilize savings mechanisms (for example, certificates of deposit) that are far superior to payment
delay.
A final question in the design of a payment mechanism is the
question of who should administer the program. While others
have suggested that the IRS may be the agency best suited to disburse UBI payments,252 our view is that the SSA is a more natural
fit—for three reasons. First, the SSA already makes monthly payments to more than 67 million beneficiaries, or over one-fifth of
the total US population.253 For it, carrying out a UBI would mean
scaling up an existing endeavor. The IRS, by contrast, only interacts with most taxpayers annually. Second, the American public
appears to have a much more favorable view of the SSA than of
the IRS. In the most recent Pew Research Center survey that
asked respondents about their views of both agencies, the share
of respondents saying that they had a favorable view of the SSA
exceeded the share with an unfavorable view by 18 percentage
points. The comparable figure for the IRS was −10 percentage

252 See, for example, Michael Munger, One and One-Half Cheers for a Basic Income
Guarantee: We Could Do Worse, and Already Have, 19 Indep Rev 503, 506 (2015) (arguing
that using the IRS to implement a UBI will result in little new bureaucracy or rulemaking
due to existing infrastructure).
253 See Social Security Administration, Monthly Statistical Snapshot, July 2018 *1
tbl 1, archived at https://perma.cc/BJG5-7MLZ.
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points (that is, the share with an unfavorable view exceeded the
share with a favorable impression). 254 Third, at least in recent
years, members of Congress have sought to vilify the IRS for a
range of alleged infractions and starved the agency of cash. 255
While ultimately a basic income will need to be funded by taxes
that the IRS collects, it would seem wise in the near term to shield
a UBI from the toxicity of tax politics as much as possible. Tasking the SSA rather than the IRS with carrying out a UBI is a step
in that direction.
F.

Funding Mechanism: Consolidate Cash and Near-Cash
Transfers While Adding a Broadbased Surtax

The previous Section asked how a UBI should be paid; a
harder question is how a UBI should be paid for. Vox’s Dylan
Matthews has argued that “[w]hether or not basic income is a
good idea depends entirely on how you pay for it,”256 and while we
think that the success of a UBI depends on more than that, we
certainly agree that the “how you pay for it” question is key. As of
mid-2018, the total population of the United States was approximately 327 million,257 and if we exclude the approximately 11 million unauthorized immigrants and 2 million temporary lawful
permanent residents,258 that leaves 314 million citizens and lawful permanent residents living in the country. Multiplying $6,000
per year by 314 million gives us a total annual cost for a UBI of
$1.884 trillion. Clearly, a UBI would be expensive.
One way to offset that cost would be to discontinue some or
all existing cash and near-cash transfer programs. Setting aside
programs administered by the SSA (to which we will return momentarily), the primary federally funded cash and near-cash
transfer programs include SNAP ($70 billion in 2018), TANF
($17 billion), the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) ($5 billion), unemployment
insurance ($32 billion), and Section 8 rental assistance
254 See Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government *58–59 (Pew Research Center, Nov 23, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/J3FV-NTHX.
255 See Leandra Lederman, IRS Reform: Politics as Usual?, 7 Colum J Tax L 36, 48–
55 (2016).
256 Dylan Matthews, A Basic Income Really Could End Poverty Forever (Vox, July 17,
2017), archived at https://perma.cc/7UW2-EDLB.
257 See QuickFacts (cited in note 152); Cohn, 5 Key Facts About U.S. Lawful Immigrants (cited in note 152); GDP (Current US$) (cited in note 152).
258 See Cohn, 5 Key Facts About U.S. Lawful Immigrants (cited in note 152).
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($34 billion).259 The EITC and child tax credit will cost a combined
$196 billion in 2018.260 So far, that sums to $354 billion, leaving a
funding gap of $1.530 trillion remaining to be filled.
Potential elimination of the OASI, DI, and SSI programs run
by the SSA raises especially difficult questions. At the end of
2017, the average monthly OASI benefit for retired workers was
$1,404;261 for disabled workers under DI, it was $1,197;262 and for
SSI recipients, it was $542.263 The estimated costs of these programs in 2018 was $848 billion for OASI, $147 billion for DI, and
$56 billion for SSI.264 Eliminating OASI, DI, and SSI would generate $1.056 trillion, bringing us two-thirds of the way toward
closing the remaining funding gap. At the same time, replacing
these programs with a $500 per month UBI would leave millions
of elderly and disabled Americans worse off—especially if it comes
with the elimination of other programs (for example, SNAP and
Section 8) from which many low-income elderly and disabled individuals also benefit. Requiring seniors to choose between a UBI
and OASI benefits—as proposed by Murray—would reduce the
cost of a UBI by roughly $240 billion,265 but would be vulnerable
to the political and philosophical objections noted above.266
For now, we set aside further discussion of the interaction
between a UBI and Social Security’s OASI program. Social Security (and OASI in particular) is often considered to be the “third
rail of American politics”;267 if a UBI is pitched as a competitor to
OASI, we are pessimistic about basic income’s political prospects.

259 See Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account: Updated April 2018 Baseline, archived at https://perma.cc/3D3H-2CU7.
260 See Congressional Budget Office, Revenue Projections, by Budget Category: Updated April 2018 Baseline, archived at https://perma.cc/N5DT-4V5H.
261 Fast Facts About Social Security at *16 (cited in note 169).
262 Id.
263 Id at *25.
264 Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account (cited in
note 259).
265 See Murray, In Our Hands at 109 (cited in note 7). As of the end of 2017, approximately 40 million OASI beneficiaries received benefits of $500 or more per month. See
Social Security Administration, Retired Worker Beneficiaries in Current Payment Status
at the End of December 2017, Distributed by Benefit Level, Sex, and Age Group (Jan 8,
2018), archived at https://perma.cc/YP3X-3BHM. Presumably, these individuals would
choose to continue receiving OASI benefits and forgo a UBI. The $240 billion figure is
40 million multiplied by a $6,000-per-year UBI.
266 See text accompanying notes 166–178.
267 Rick Shenkman, When Did Social Security Become the Third Rail of American
Politics? (History News Network, Mar 6, 2005), archived at https://perma.cc/NW9P-3G35.
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With respect to DI and SSI, we can anticipate welfarist, egalitarian, and libertarian reactions. Welfarists might argue that even
if disability determinations are imperfect, DI and SSI eligibility
are still rough proxies for ability to pay. Transfers to the disabled
(or, more precisely, transfers to individuals whom the SSA has
determined to be disabled) still will—on balance—move money
from individuals with lower marginal utility of income to individuals with higher marginal utility of income. Some egalitarians
(such as Professor Anderson) might argue that even if everyone
ought to receive a basic income, disabled individuals ought to receive something more, because they require more resources in order to exercise equivalent freedoms.268 Libertarians, we expect,
will be the most hostile toward maintaining DI and SSI because
they (1) are likely the most skeptical about the informational
value of government disability determinations and (2) are most
concerned about the increase in taxes that will be necessary to
close the UBI funding gap if DI and SSI are preserved.
A split-the-difference approach might be to reduce but not
eliminate DI and SSI benefits. For purposes of our running tally,
we will assume that benefits are reduced by one-third—an arbitrary fraction that we choose because we think that one of the
three theories that form our philosophical foundation for a UBI
would seem to suggest that those programs be eliminated entirely. (We understand that a real-world UBI might strike the balance differently.) That reduces the UBI funding gap by a further
$68 billion. Adding in the previously discussed change to the tax
treatment of Social Security benefits brings us $38 billion more.269
Of course, that still leaves us with a long way to go.
One option is to scale back federal funding for health care.
The dollars at stake are significant: $383 billion for Medicaid,
$18 billion for the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP),270 $47 billion for Affordable Care Act premium tax credits, and more than $700 billion for Medicare. 271 And the basic
268 See Anderson, A Basic Income for All (cited in note 95) (“Disabled people typically
require more resources to achieve equivalent freedoms—to move around, to get access to
information, and so forth—than those who are not disabled.”). See also note 123.
269 See text accompanying notes 177–178.
270 See Congressional Budget Office, Spending Projections, by Budget Account (cited
in note 259).
271 See id; Juliette Cubanski, Tricia Neuman, and Meredith Freed, Issue Brief, The
Facts on Medicare Spending and Financing *1 (Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Aug
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/9JCU-MZBA.
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resource-egalitarian and libertarian arguments in favor of unrestricted cash transfers—that individuals should have the opportunity to choose for themselves how that money is spent—would
seem to apply to health care just as much as SNAP. On the other
hand, there is perhaps a plausible argument that the government
enjoys informational and scale advantages vis-à-vis the free market in the provision of health coverage, which may be why most
other advanced economies have chosen to channel health insurance through the public sector.272 Moreover, in some states, the
average premium for an individual health insurance plan would
eat up the entire $500 per month UBI.273 For many Medicaid recipients and other beneficiaries of federally subsidized health insurance, eliminating those subsidies and pouring the savings into
a UBI would be of little help at all. We will therefore proceed on
the assumption that these programs will remain in place. If they
were eliminated in order to make fiscal room for a UBI, the funding challenge would be significantly less daunting.
All this leaves us with a $1.424 trillion funding gap. At least
some of that money is likely to come from an increase in income
taxes.274 To be sure, some could come from other sorts of taxes,
such as a carbon tax. In fact, two prominent Republicans have
recently called for a carbon tax coupled with a rebate that is essentially a UBI.275 Yet, a carbon tax set at the social cost of carbon
272 See David M. Cutler, Health Care and the Public Sector, in Alan J. Auerbach and
Martin Feldstein, eds, 4 Handbook of Public Economics 2143, 2167–69 (Elsevier 2002)
(discussing different justifications for public and private provision of health insurance and
noting that countries with public health insurance tend to spend less on it).
273 See, for example, Catherine Ho, California Health Insurance Premiums to Rise an
Average of Nearly 9% in 2019 (SF Chron, July 19, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/5Q2T-7MGZ (noting that the average premium for an individual plan without
subsidies in California is $500 per month).
274 Andy Stern has suggested using a value-added tax (VAT) of 5 percent to 10 percent
to offset some of a UBI’s cost. See Stern with Kravitz, Raising the Floor at 212–13 (cited
in note 9). But a VAT does not avoid the trade-off between a larger UBI and higher income
taxes because a VAT is the rough economic equivalent of an additional tax on labor income.
See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Value-Added Taxation: A Tax Whose Time Has Come?, 9 J Econ
Perspectives 121, 131–32 (1995). Proposals for a UBI funded by a wealth tax also do not
avoid this basic trade-off because a wealth tax is the economic equivalent of a tax on the
risk-free component of capital income. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax
with a Wealth Tax, 53 Tax L Rev 423, 435–41 (2000).
275 See John Schwartz, ‘A Conservative Climate Solution’: Republican Group Calls for
Carbon Tax (NY Times, Feb 7, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/R45S-XMHG (discussing a proposal by James A. Baker III and George P. Shultz—both former Republican secretaries of state—to tax fossil fuels and then give consumers a “carbon dividend”). This
proposal demonstrates that one potential advantage of a carbon tax–funded UBI is that it
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would offset only a small portion of a UBI’s costs. US energyrelated carbon emissions amounted to 5.27 billion metric tons in
2018; a carbon tax of approximately $36 per metric ton would—
holding emissions constant—raise $190 billion per year.276 This is
almost certainly an overestimate because the whole point of a carbon tax, aside from raising revenue, is to reduce carbon output.
In any event, it would still leave us with a funding gap of
$1.234 trillion.
Total income reported on individual income tax returns for
tax year 2017 (filing year 2018), the most recent year for which
comprehensive data are available, was approximately
$11.170 trillion. 277 We add US corporate pretax profits of
$2.044 trillion, as measured in the first quarter of 2018.278 That
yields an individual and corporate income tax base of $13.214 trillion. A crude way to think about the tax increase that would be
necessary in order to offset the cost of a UBI is to imagine a flat
surtax on all income (individual as well as corporate). Dividing
the $1.234 trillion funding gap that remains after the imposition
of a carbon tax by the $13.214 trillion base amount yields a rate
of approximately 9.3 percent. Each additional $100 billion in cost
savings would translate to a 0.75 percentage point reduction in
the requisite tax. We should add that the 9.3 percent figure is almost certainly an underestimate, as it does not yet take into account the behavioral effects of higher taxes.279
may be able to garner bipartisan support. More recently, several chapters of the College
Republicans have endorsed such a proposal. See Lisa Friedman, College Republicans Propose an Unusual Idea from the Right: A Carbon Tax (NY Times, Mar 6, 2018), archived at
https://perma.cc/EW2U-BEHZ (reporting that Republican student groups at twenty-three
universities joined together to form the coalition “Students for Carbon Dividends” to raise
support for a carbon tax).
276 For the emissions figure, see US Energy Information Administration, What Are
U.S. Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Source and Sector? (May 15, 2019) archived at https://perma.cc/Q5E8-HUN5 (2018 figures). The $36 per ton figure reflects the
$31 per ton figure in William D. Nordhaus, Revisiting the Social Cost of Carbon, 114 Proceedings Natl Acad Sci 1518, 1520 (2017). Professor Nordhaus’s figure is stated in 2010
dollars, so we update to reflect inflation between 2010 and 2018. See CPI Inflation Calculator at *4 (cited in note 16).
277 See Internal Revenue Service, Individual Income Tax Returns, 2017 *20 fig A
(2019), archived at https://perma.cc/VH4H-US2G.
278 See National Income: Corporate Profits Before Tax (Without IVA and CCAdj) (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Sept 26, 2019), online at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/
series/A053RC1Q027SBEA (visited Jan 25, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable).
279 See Norton Francis, et al, Tax Policy Center’s Briefing Book: A Citizen’s Guide to
the Fascinating (Though Often Complex) Elements of the Federal Tax System *45 (Urban
Institute, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/X6H8-TVDE.
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Eliminating a variety of tax expenditures—such as the exclusion of employer-sponsored health insurance, the home mortgage
interest deduction, the 20 percent deduction for pass-through income, and stepped-up basis at death280—could generate additional
revenues that would offset a UBI’s cost. The Joint Committee on
Taxation’s expenditure estimates associated with those provisions for fiscal year 2019 sum to $290.9 billion ($172.8 billion for
health insurance, $33.9 billion for mortgage interest, $50.2 billion for pass-throughs, and $34.0 billion for stepped-up basis).281
Eliminating those expenditures and using the revenue to offset
the cost of a UBI would, very roughly speaking,282 reduce the size
of the surtax needed to fund a $500 per month basic income from
9.3 percent to 7.1 percent. We should emphasize, however, that
eliminating tax expenditures does not allow lawmakers to avoid
the trade-off between a larger UBI and higher tax rates. Eliminating the abovementioned tax expenditures would still cause
millions of taxpayers to pay higher effective tax rates.
Nor can that essential trade-off between a larger UBI and
higher taxes be avoided by adding income-based phaseouts to a
UBI. As noted above,283 an income-based phaseout is simply a surtax in sheep’s clothing. Consider a hypothetical UBI of $10,000
that phased out at a rate of 25 cents per dollar of income above
$20,000. For every additional $100 of income, a taxpayer sees her
UBI drop by $25. This is economically equivalent to a tax of
25 percent.284 The only difference is that a phaseout applies only
to that subsection of taxpayers in the phaseout range.285
280

See IRC §§ 106, 163(h), 199A, 1014.
Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal
Years 2017–2021 *37 (mortgage interest), *38 (pass-through income and stepped-up basis), *42 (employer-sponsored health insurance) (May 25, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/NNU3-2UAD.
282 We caution that tax expenditure estimates are not the same as revenue estimates,
though they tend to be quite close. See Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Estimates Approximate Revenue Estimates, 145 Tax Notes 701, 704–05 (2014).
283 See Part I.B.
284 In fact, existing welfare programs contain this type of implicit tax. When a taxpayer loses SNAP benefits of $24 because her income increases by $100, that is equivalent
to a 24 percent tax. See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Marginal Tax Rates for
Low- and Moderate-Income Workers in 2016 *3 (Nov 2015), archived at https://
perma.cc/S3X3-9YMH (discussing the phaseout of benefits and its impact on marginal tax
rates).
285 In this hypothetical, once a taxpayer’s income exceeds $40,000, her UBI is fully
phased out ($40,000 × 25 percent = $10,000) and she faces no additional implicit tax due
to the phaseout.
281
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Ultimately, whether a UBI is funded through an explicit surtax on income or through a surtax that is partly redescribed as a
“phaseout,” we think that policymakers should draw from more
than a century of experience in the design of income taxes in the
United States. A few key lessons emerge. First, there is no need
to construct an entirely new definition of income for the taxes
used to fund a UBI. The additional surtax can be layered onto the
existing tax structure, given that Congress, the courts, and the
IRS over the years have developed a rich set of standards and
rules that aim to measure ability to pay while accommodating
other policy concerns.286 Although this may seem obvious to those
well-versed in tax policy, nontax welfare programs routinely use
alternative definitions of income when imposing phaseouts. 287
Given that several other UBI proposals incorporate taxes cast as
phaseouts based on “income” without defining income, we think
it important to clarify this point. Second, there is no need for a
new agency to collect the funds that go toward a UBI: the task
falls firmly within the IRS’s wheelhouse.
Third, cliff effects should be avoided. For instance, the current structure of the EITC causes taxpayers to lose their entire
credit when their investment income crosses the $3,600 threshold.288 This structure—which in some cases imposes an implicit
286 Indeed, as Professor John Brooks illustrates, the Code already offers several definitions of income from which to choose, including gross income, adjusted gross income,
taxable income, alternative minimum taxable income, and various definitions of “modified
adjusted gross income.” See Brooks, 71 Tax L Rev at 253 n 2 (cited in note 19).
287 California’s TANF program, CalWORKs, requires recipients to include in income
free rent or utilities, bills paid by others, and “contribution[s] from persons, organizations,
or assistance agencies”; many of these transfers would likely count as excludable gifts for
income tax purposes. California Department of Social Services, Health and Human Services Agency, Manual of Policies and Procedures: Eligibility and Assistance Standards
*376 (definition of income for benefit-eligibility determination includes contributions from
others), *404–05 (inclusion of housing and utilities paid by others in income), archived at
https://perma.cc/W3G4-DBUM. See also IRC § 102(a) (“Gross income does not include the
value of property acquired by gift.”). Further, Section 8 requires the inclusion of child support and alimony payments, 24 CFR § 5.609(b)(7), even though the former have long been
excluded from gross income and the latter are now excluded as well. See IRC § 71(a)
(providing that alimony is included in gross income), repealed by the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act § 11051, Pub L No 115-97, 131 Stat 2054, 2089 (2017). This divergence is also true on
the deduction side; for example, many programs allow deductions for “excess” shelter
costs. See, for example, US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, SNAP
Eligibility: Frequently Asked Questions, archived at https://perma.cc/CC89-UGJD.
288 See Internal Revenue Service, 2019 EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit
Amounts and Tax Law Updates (July 10, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/7E7R-S94L.
The threshold is adjusted annually for inflation.
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marginal tax rate of over 655,000 percent on the 3,601st dollar of
investment income—is almost certainly not the best way to design a tax system.289 Unfortunately, some current UBI proposals
contain such effects. Consider Chris Hughes’s proposal to give
$500 per month ($6,000 per year) to every adult earning less than
$50,000 a year “who is working in some way”—which, according
to Hughes, should include college students as well as individuals
who care for young children or care for aging or disabled adults.290
Hughes’s scheme is economically equivalent to a phaseout-free
basic income for working individuals of $6,000 per year, combined
with an additional tax of $6,000 once income reaches $50,000. The
result is a strange (and likely quite distortionary) cliff effect at
the 50,001st dollar of income: a marginal rate of 600,000 percent
on that dollar.
Fourth, policymakers should be cognizant of the marriage incentives potentially embedded in phaseouts and surtaxes and
should avoid arrangements that severely penalize marriage.
Hughes’s phaseout, for example, would also impose a harsh marriage penalty: for example, two single individuals each earning
$26,000 would lose a combined $12,000 per year by marrying.291
More sophisticated UBI phaseouts often embed marriage penalties as well. For example, Jessica Wiederspan and collaborators
at the University of Michigan School of Social Work have modeled
proposals that would set a UBI at 75 percent, 100 percent, or
133 percent of the federal poverty level, with a phaseout rate of
33 percent or 50 percent.292 All of these setups would involve steep
marriage penalties because the poverty level is a function of
household size. For example, with a UBI at 100 percent of the
poverty level and a phaseout rate of 33 percent, two adults

289 One single dollar of extra income—specifically, the 3,601st dollar—causes one to
lose one’s entire EITC, which can be as high as $6,557. On cliff effects more generally and
the EITC-investment income cliff in particular, see Manoj Viswanathan, The Hidden Costs
of Cliff Effects in the Internal Revenue Code, 164 U Pa L Rev 931, 936–39 (2016).
290 Hughes, Fair Shot at 92–93 (cited in note 8).
291 See Felix Salmon, Book Review, Chris Hughes Made Millions at Facebook. Now
He Has a Plan to End Poverty (NY Times, Feb 25, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/
YMD2-3J34, reviewing Hughes, Fair Shot (cited in note 8) (noting the “nasty marriage
penalty” implicit in Hughes’s proposal).
292 See Wiederspan, et al, 19 J Poverty at 229 tbl 3 (cited in note 197).
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earning $20,000 per year would face a marriage penalty of $9,090
if they wed.293
Fifth and finally, policymakers should seek to avoid sky-high
marginal rates. A surtax in the 7 to 10 percentage point range,
spread across all taxpayers, would put the top marginal rate on
individuals only slightly above where it stood before 2018 and
would leave the rate on corporations well below pre-2018 levels.294
One consequence of a low, yet universal surtax of, say, 10 percent
is that as a practical matter, one’s UBI is not fully offset by additional taxes until one’s income is $60,000. Put another way, our
UBI would not phase out until $60,000 of income.
One advantage of rolling together various cash and near-cash
transfer programs and imposing a single surtax is that it allows
policymakers to avoid some of the perverse incentives generated
by the status quo. For example, the combination of the EITC and
SNAP phaseouts and the 10 percent federal income tax bracket
results in marginal tax rates above 50 percent for some lowincome households.295 Those same phaseouts plus Medicaid eligibility criteria can generate substantial marriage penalties for
some couples as well.296 With fewer moving pieces, policymakers
can structure a UBI and any accompanying phaseout or surtax to
minimize these potential pitfalls.
Our UBI will, inevitably, produce winners and losers. The
overwhelming majority of low-income individuals and families
would be winners. A UBI of $500 per person per month—$2,000
per month for a four-member household—would more than compensate for the loss of SNAP benefits (up to $192 per month for a
single person and up to $640 per month for a four-person

293 This calculation is based on a federal poverty level of $12,752 for a single individual and $16,414 for a two-person household. 2 × ($12,752 – 33 percent × $20,000) −
($16,414 – 33 percent × $40,000) = $9,090.
294 The December 2017 tax law reduced the top marginal tax rate on individuals by
3.8 percentage points and the rate on corporations by 14 percentage points. The 3.8 percentage point reduction for individuals was a function of a 2.6 percentage point cut in the
statutory rate plus the elimination of the Pease phaseout, which had added up to 1.2 percentage points. See Michael Kitces, Individual Tax Planning Under the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 (Kitces, Dec 18, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/MLA2-RHDD.
295 See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Marginal Tax Rates at *3 (cited in
note 284).
296 See W. Bradford Wilcox, Joseph P. Price, and Angela Rachidi, Marriage, Penalized:
Does Social-Welfare Policy Affect Family Formation? *15 (AEI Institute for Family Studies, July 26, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/296M-NU6L.

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

705

household)297 and/or the EITC (the equivalent of up to $44.08 per
month for a single person and up to $485.67 per month for a twoadult, two-child household). 298 Throwing the refundable child
credit (the equivalent of $233.33 per month for a two-child household) into the mix does not change this calculus.299 Even those
who also qualify for WIC (average monthly benefit of roughly $41
per person) on top of SNAP and the EITC will almost always prefer the UBI.300 For those somewhat higher up the income ladder,
the benefit from a UBI will more than offset the cost of the additional surtax until income reaches at least $60,000 for a single
individual and at least $240,000 for a four-member household.
To be sure, there will be a relatively small number of lowincome individuals and families who will receive less under our
proposal than under the status quo—in particular, some Section 8
voucher recipients living in high-rent areas and some families in
states such as Alaska and New Hampshire where TANF benefits
are especially generous.301 Our view is that a more even distribution of benefits among low-income individuals and families is
preferable to the status quo, in which programs such as Section 8
provide substantial benefits to a very small portion of low-income
families but leave others languishing on long waiting lists.302 We
also believe that a $500-per-month UBI that, as explained above,
is not recaptured by increased taxes until one’s income is $60,000
is preferable to a larger UBI that is phased out at a lower income
(such as Murray’s proposal). While the latter may better target
certain very poor individuals, such frameworks necessitate regressive tax structures that import many of the existing work disincentives into the UBI context. Likewise, the fact that our proposal replaces most of the existing welfare state instead of adding
to it renders it economically feasible and will cause fewer
297 See Memorandum from Silbermann, SNAP — Fiscal Year 2018 at *3 (cited in
note 147).
298 See 2019 EITC Income Limits (cited in note 288).
299 See IRC § 24(a), (d), (h)(5).
300 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, WIC Program:
Average Monthly Benefit per Person *2 (Mar 8, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/XGW3
-GAVT. The comparison should also include the effect of the new income surtax, the effect
of which will be modest when income is modest.
301 See Ashley Burnside and Ife Floyd, TANF Benefits Remain Low Despite Recent
Increases in Some States *13 appx tbl 1 (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Jan 22,
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/JD9B-WMM7.
302 See, for example, Max Nesterak, Section Wait: Federal Housing Vouchers Hard to
Get, Hard to Use (Minn Public Radio, July 18, 2018), archived at https://
perma.cc/3EQA-E33X.
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economic distortions. Almost any intervention that unsettles the
existing public-assistance landscape will leave some people worse
off, and choosing among assistance programs requires making
hard trade-offs. But the upside of our proposal—a strong safety net
with fewer holes and distortions—seems to us to be well worth it.
IV. THE OUTWARD FAÇADE OF A UBI
So far we have deferred discussion of whether a UBI should
be truly “universal” or whether benefits should phase out after
income exceeds a certain threshold. We have deferred that discussion primarily because the question is semantic: As illustrated in
Part I.B, the exact same scheme can be described as (a) a UBI
with no phaseout that is funded by a surtax on income, (b) a UBI
that phases out, or (c) a negative income tax. The different framings may affect the political popularity of the proposal; they do
not (or at least, need not) affect program design.
As a practical matter, we think that the easiest way to implement a UBI would be for the SSA to make uniform biweekly or
semimonthly payments via direct deposit to each eligible individual’s account and for the offsetting surtax to be integrated into
the existing individual income tax system. There would be no
need for the SSA to track the income of 314 million citizens and
lawful permanent residents on a biweekly basis to ensure that
they remain below the phaseout threshold; if you are a US citizen
or a Green Card holder, you will be entitled to receive $250 twice
a month regardless of how much other income you make.
As an optical matter, the advantage of this arrangement is
that it effectively frames a UBI as a universal program, rather
than as a form of “welfare” that goes only to the poor. Basic income supporters hope that this “universal” framing will make a
UBI as popular as OASI (which reaches most seniors) and Medicare (which reaches every US citizen over sixty-five and every
lawful permanent resident over that age who has resided in the
United States for the past five years).303 The disadvantage is that
some may react negatively to the notion of the über-rich receiving
government payments. Financial journalist Felix Salmon reflects
this view in a recent critique of basic income proposals, writing
that:

303

For Medicare eligibility requirements, see 42 CFR § 406.20.
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UBI is a pretty inefficient way of giving poor people money.
Think about it this way: Just 40 percent of a UBI’s expenditure would go to the bottom 40 percent of the population, and
a mere 10 percent would go to the 10 percent who need it
most. What would happen to the rest of the money?
Study after study has shown that when you give money
to the homeless and the very poor, they don’t spend it on frivolities like booze and tobacco: In fact, rates of drinking and
smoking invariably go down rather than up. On the other
hand, if you gave me an extra $1,500 per month, no strings
attached, I’m sure a significant chunk of that would end up
in my wine fridge. That might be popular with my local wine
merchants, but as a means of redistributing society’s wealth
in the interests of fairness and equality, it does leave something to be desired.304
In one sense, Salmon—despite being one of the smartest and
most perceptive commentators on economic policy today—has
been fooled by the framing of a UBI into thinking that highincome individuals like himself would be receiving “extra” money.
Salmon reportedly earned more than $400,000 in 2017;305 if the
income tax rate is raised by 7 percent to 10 percent in order to
offset the cost of a UBI, Salmon will have tens of thousands of
dollars less each year to spend on his wine collection, even though
he will receive a UBI via direct deposit every two weeks.
In theory, a UBI could be implemented such that Salmon and
other high-income individuals do not receive any payment. Either
we could track each individual’s income throughout the year and
withhold payment from high-income individuals, or we could
switch to an annual payment cycle and implement a UBI as a
negative income tax. The former approach would raise administrative costs substantially. 306 The latter tack would make it
harder for individuals to smooth consumption throughout the
year. The “negative income tax” framing suffers from the

304 Felix Salmon, Universal Basic Income Is Not the Solution to Poverty (Slate, July
10, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4BT2-7PNL.
305 See Silvia Killingsworth, Felix Salmon, “Fusion Money,” and Floating Upward
(The Awl, Jan 31, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4NNW-QJ6H.
306 Experience with the advance EITC and the high administrative costs of current
means-tested programs demonstrate these challenges. See note 243 (discussing difficulties
with distributing EITC payments throughout the year).
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additional disadvantage of including two words that do not elicit
warm reactions: “negative” and “tax.”
If resistance remains fierce to the notion of the rich “receiving” a basic income, we could add an extra line to the individual
income tax return on which high-income individuals “pay back”
their UBI. This would be similar to the phaseout of personal exemptions prior to the December 2017 tax law307 and the incomebased limitation on the child tax credit under the current Code.308
By relying on phaseouts rather than raising rates, lawmakers
complicate the tax-filing process to achieve economically equivalent but less transparent results. Perhaps there are benefits of
this approach from a political perspective; as a matter of policy,
we see nothing to recommend it.
Finally, a UBI could be framed as a new “tax credit” rather
than a new benefit without changing any of its essential features.
There is some evidence to suggest that individuals react more positively to cash transfers that are described as “tax credits” rather
than as spending programs.309 The difference is merely semantic:
some tax credits are paid out more frequently than annually and
administered in tandem with agencies other than the IRS.310 Further survey experiments can shed light on whether reframing
would foment greater support; for present purposes, the key point
is that whether a UBI is framed as a new tax credit or a new public benefit is a piece of the façade rather than an element of deep
structure.
CONCLUSION
We have argued in favor of a universal basic income of $500
per month ($6,000 per year) that would be paid to every US citizen and lawful permanent resident via direct deposit in biweekly
installments, administered by the SSA, and funded by the consolidation of some (but not necessarily all) existing cash and nearcash transfer programs as well as a modest increase in taxes. Up

307

See IRC § 151(d)(3) (phaseout of personal exemptions).
See IRC § 24(b) (income-based limitation on the child tax credit); IRC § 24(h)(1)–
(3) (income-based limits applicable for 2018–2025).
309 See Conor Clarke and Edward Fox, Note, Perceptions of Taxing and Spending: A
Survey Experiment, 124 Yale L J 1252, 1277–78 (2015).
310 See, for example, IRC § 36B(b) (monthly payment of Affordable Care Act premium
assistance credits); IRC § 36B(e)(3) (significant regulatory authority over premium tax
credits allocated to Secretary of Health and Human Services).
308

2020]

The Architecture of a Basic Income

709

until now, we have considered a UBI as a sharp break from the
status quo. Migration toward a UBI could occur more gradually,
however. While our focus is on a UBI as an alternative to the status quo, our analysis also suggests ways in which existing transfer programs could improve incrementally, even if the goal of a
UBI remains distant.
First, as noted above, many existing transfers come with severe restrictions on use. SNAP benefits cannot be used to buy toilet paper or Tylenol. 311 Section 8 vouchers generally cannot be
used to rent apartments with shared kitchens.312 Welfarist, resource egalitarian, and libertarian approaches all support
changes to these rules that would allow recipients to exert more
control over the use of their benefits. One move in a desirable direction would be to consolidate SNAP, TANF, and Section 8 into
a single program that provides recipients with debit-like cards
and allows them to spend their benefits without micromanaging
their choices.
Second, many existing transfers are conditional upon work.
For example, a parent cannot claim the child tax credit unless she
receives at least $2,500 per year in earned income, and the full
$1,400 refundable credit is available only if the parent earns at
least $11,833.313 Denying support to the individuals and families
that need it most makes little sense from a welfarist, egalitarian,
or libertarian perspective. Changes to the child tax credit and
EITC that extend benefits to those at the very bottom would not
bring us all the way to a UBI, but they would put us somewhat
closer to that ideal.314
Third, as noted above, the tangle of phaseouts for existing
cash and near-cash transfer programs can generate high marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution that discourage low-income adults from working.315 We have argued that
a shift to a UBI could address this problem by replacing all of

311 See US Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): What Can SNAP Buy? (Sept 4, 2013), archived at
https://perma.cc/YB7M-24XR.
312 See 24 CFR § 982.401(d)(2)(i).
313 See IRC § 24(d), (h)(5)–(6). The refundable portion of the tax credit is limited to
15 percent of earned income in excess of $2,500. $(11,833 − 2,500) × 15 percent = $1,400.
314 See Benjamin M. Leff, EITC for All: A Universal Basic Income Compromise Proposal *20–30 (unpublished manuscript, 2019) (on file with authors); Dylan Matthews, A
California Child Allowance (Medium: Economic Security Project, Aug 22, 2017), archived
at https://perma.cc/NVT9-U4BV.
315 See text accompanying note 295.
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those phaseouts with a single surtax at a modest rate. Yet even
without going all the way to a UBI, policymakers could “pop”
these bubble rates by consolidating cash and near-cash transfers
into one program with a less-punishing phaseout structure.
Such modesty may prove unnecessary, however, if voters and
politicians from multiple points on the ideological spectrum can
coalesce around a national basic income program. If and when
that happens, the design questions canvassed in this Article will
take on central significance. We do not claim to have found all the
answers yet. We do believe, though, that goals of ending extreme
poverty and empowering low-income individuals can be advanced
through greater scholarly attention to a UBI’s nuts and bolts.

